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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS)
Act in 2012 amidst a perceived crisis in entrepreneurial capital rais-
ing.' The number of initial public offerings (IPOs)-long the gold
standard for capital raising by successful emerging companies-has
dropped off considerably in the last decade.2 Companies not yet large
or successful enough to consider an IPO complain about the obstacles
t Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University Law
Center.
tt Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Our thanks to Anna Pinedo for helpful comments.
I SeeJumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2 See The Endangered Public Company: The Big Engine That Couldn't, EcoNoMIsr, May 19,
2012, at 28 (reporting a drop of thirty-eight percent in the number of public companies
since 1997 and a drop in the number of yearly IPOs from an average of 311 in the
1980-2000 period to 81 in 2011).
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associated with finding early-stage capital from venture capitalists or
"angel" investors just in trying to get off the ground.3 Loosening up
on the securities laws' regulatory burdens was the chosen legislative
solution, demonstrating a political willingness to trade off some level
of investor protection in order to promote capital formation and its
hoped-for payoff, job creation.
We can hardly be sure this will work because we do not yet under-
stand enough to explain why IPOs have dropped in numbers or why
capital formation has apparently come under such stress. It could
have more to do with structural changes in our knowledge-based
economy or the shifting preferences and sentiments of consumers
and investors than with regulatory costs.4 Even if we focus on regula-
tion, it is far from clear which regulations most need pruning. Regula-
tory effects are often dimly understood.5  Complaints by
entrepreneurs about unnecessary costs can help spot inefficient regu-
latory requirements; however, they can also mask a self-serving effort
on the part of those entrepreneurs to gain a bigger share of the pri-
vate benefits of corporate control through diminished disclosure and
accountability, all simply under the pretext of job creation.
Before the JOBS Act had taken on any political momentum, the
two of us embarked on a project to remap the public-private bounda-
ries under the securities laws in light of the remarkable technological
change that has taken place in recent decades. This change is inter-
esting because it creates opportunities for innovative, hybrid forms of
capital raising and securities trading that do not fit neatly within tradi-
tional regulatory boundaries. With the new legislation, we now have
the opportunity to examine critically how the new ideas that Congress
has given us either fit with or alter that map. The JOBS Act plainly
creates more space on the less (or un-) regulated private side of the
line, where we think-for better or worse-its biggest long-term im-
pact will be.
This Article focuses on the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act), which
regulates public capital-raising transactions.6 Essentially, the '33 Act
requires issuers and their affiliates to register public offerings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The registration tem-
plate comprises four parts that are characteristic of American securi-
3 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1, 6-7
(2012).
4 SeeJay R. Ritter et al., Where Have All the lPOs Gone? (Dec. 17, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954788.
5 See generally Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged
Regulation, 97 CoRN ELL L. REV. 1267 (2012) (arguing that because their effects are difficult
to predict, regulations should be applied incrementally).
6 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77c (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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ties regulation more generally: (1) mandatory disclosure to potential
investors; (2) preoffering review of those disclosures by a specialized
government agency (the SEC); (3) restrictions on the selling process
so as to give the disclosures sufficient potency to generate informed
investment decisions; and (4) liability threats to enforce each of these
interventions and promote high-quality disclosure.8
There are two boundaries of particular importance, both of
which are under considerable pressure. First, some offerings of secur-
ities are exempt from '33 Act requirements because they are "private"
or otherwise limited in terms of size, scope, or nature of investors be-
ing solicited.9 These exemptions had been reasonably well under-
stood, at least until the JOBS Act, but were always somewhat
controversial. The second boundary lies between securities transac-
tions regulated by the '33 Act on the one side and companies and
transactions regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act)' 0 on the other. Once complete, any offering-whether regis-
tered or exempt-places securities in investors' hands. Absent regula-
tory or contractual restriction, we can expect resales to occur soon
thereafter. When there is large enough supply and demand, trading
markets will emerge to support trading by investors among them-
selves. The '34 Act provides various investor protections for traders,
including extensive disclosure and increasingly, corporate governance
requirements for issuers of actively traded securities. But it does so
differently from the '33 Act, and often with less regulatory intensity,
for reasons we will explore.
For issuers who make registered public offerings under the '33
Act, the transition to the '34 Act arena is largely seamless because the
very act of '33 Act registration places the issuer in the '34 Act regime"
(as does listing on a national securities exchange like the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ which almost always accompa-
nies a registered public offering). 12 For issuers who have not (yet)
made a public offering, on the other hand, the situation is quite dif-
ferent, and this is what originally piqued our interest. In the last pe-
riod prior to its IPO, Facebook offered a particularly salient
illustration of this as it sought to raise capital from a sizeable number
of private investors who would be bundled in a single investment vehi-
8 See SEC, Form S-1, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-I.pdf.
9 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
11 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (subjecting companies who have
made a registered public offering to periodic disclosure requirements).
12 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b), 78m(a), 78n(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (subjecting compa-
nies with a class of equity securities registered on a securities exchange to periodic disclo-
sure and proxy regulation).
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cle.1 3 So long as the issuer's own capital-raising transactions were truly
exempt, the issuer would be free of the burdensome '33 Act obliga-
tions. But what about resales? In recent years, nonexchange trading
markets like SharesPost and SecondMarket, among others, popped up
to facilitate resales-and thereby provide liquidity-without turning
private issuers into public ones so as to give rise to disclosure obliga-
tions under the '34 Act. 14 Moreover, the single-investment vehicle
kept the issuing company's number of shareholders from rising above
the threshold for public status.15 The JOBS Act addressed the legal
gymnastics required to avoid '34 Act status,1 6 although it did not do
this particularly well. We have explored this particular issue else-
where, along with the JOBS Act's separate encouragement of regis-
tered IPOs for emerging growth companies (accomplished by offering
them a somewhat deregulated "on-ramp" into the '34 Act regulatory
system).1 7
As we began thinking through the legal gymnastics of facilitating
private secondary trading while avoiding the '34 Act, we noticed other
places where similar innovations were occurring that enabled issuers
to avoid the burdens of '33 Act registration by bypassing a traditional
registered public offering. There has been much publicity recently
about "reverse mergers"-especially those involving Chinese firms-
wherein a private company instantly achieves public status in U.S.
trading markets by merging into a shell company that, conveniently,
has already been registered with the SEC under the '34 Act (even
though registration offers no information of value because it describes
an empty shell).1 8 That such actions are often referred to as "back-
door registrations" strongly hints at the regulatory arbitrage going on
here. These are commonplace transactions-a fact that has attracted
special regulatory and political attention for geopolitical reasons 19-
13 See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Secur-
ities Regulation After theJOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 338 (2013).
14 See Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 21-23; Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall
Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 193-202 (2012); Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight ofEquity Li-
quidity, 34 CARDozo L. REV. 531, 556-57 (2012).
15 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 81(g), 78m(a), 78n(a) (subjecting companies with shareholders
and assets above the threshold numbers to periodic disclosure and proxy regulation).
16 SeeJumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306,
325 (2012) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1)(A)) (raising the threshold number of record
shareholders from 500 to 2000 so long as no more than 499 are nonaccredited investors).
17 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 13, at 342. For different suggestions ad-
dressing this set of problems, see Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in theJOBS Act: How
and Why to Rewrite the Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151
(2013).
18 See Leslie A. Gordon, Red-Flagging China: Regulators Eye Chinese Companies Using Re-
verse Mergers to Enter U.S., A.B.A. J., Oct. 2011, at 17.
19 See Dinny McMahon & Andrew Ackerman, SEC Wrestles With China: Deloitte Case
Highlights Agency's Frustration with Beijing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2011, at BI3; Luis A. Agui-
lar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech at the Council of Institutional Investors
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and hundreds of millions of dollars of securities become public
through the back door each year.20
Reverse mergers, in turn, may lead to another type of financing
transaction: a "Private Investment in Public Equity" (PIPE) deal,
which allows the issuer (which is often distressed) to finance itself
through a private placement with one or more investors. In such a
deal, the private investors require the issuer to file a '33 Act registra-
tion statement to support their resales to public investors. The curios-
ity here is that the resale registration statement is deemed a secondary
transaction (that is, one by the investors and not the issuer), which
gains simplified regulatory treatment falling short of what conven-
tional issuer registration would involve. The result, essentially, is an
indirect public offering in the '33 Act sense of that term but without
the usual liability protections that would accrue to investors in a tradi-
tionally underwritten public offering.
Neither of these innovative transaction types has received the crit-
ical scholarly attention it deserves, 21 which we will try to remedy in
Part II. Understanding these transactions in the transition space be-
tween the '33 and '34 Acts necessarily requires a better-developed the-
ory of publicness: Which companies should be subjected to the
obligations of one or both of the statutes? And, after eighty years,
have the ideas of publicness in the two regimes finally converged so
that distinctive treatment makes no sense? In Part I, we develop our
view that the value added by the '33 Act lies in addressing the special
selling efforts needed to stimulate demand for a large quantity of
stock. The reverse mergers and PIPE transactions treated in Part II
are best analyzed this way even though they are clothed in a transac-
tional setting that takes advantage of the less intense regulation of the
'34 Act. What is striking is that reverse mergers and PIPEs became
standard transactional devices even though they seemingly skimp on
traditional investor protections, particularly as they relate to the dili-
gence that deal participants must display, without the SEC having for-
Spring Meeting: Facilitating Real Capital Formation (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spchO4O4lllaa.htm.
20 As discussed infra note 123 and accompanying text, the SEC has recently approved
revised NASDAQ listing standards for reverse merger issuers, which will no doubt reduce
the attractiveness of this technique. There was no change, however, to the legal standards
for reverse mergers themselves.
21 William Sjostrom deserves much credit for his work in this area. See generally Wil-
liam K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Truth About Reverse Mergers, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 743
(2008) [hereinafter Sjostrom, Truth About Reverse Mergers] (discussing reverse mergers);
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., PIPEs, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 381 (2007) [hereinafter Sjos-
trom, PIPEs] (discussing the increasing use of PIPEs and the SEC's response to them); see
also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public Through an Internet Direct Public Offering: A Sensible
Alternative for Small Companies?, 53 FLA. L. REv. 529, 531 (2001) [hereinafter Sjostrom, In-
ternet Direct Offereings] (discussing how companies can circumvent the normal process for
offerings using underwriters by making offerings online).
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mally (that is, through rule) recognized their existence. Well after
they became commonplace, the SEC shifted its policy as to them in
certain respects. Our claim is that this is an illustration of a too-fre-
quent phenomenon: creative lawyers and their clients claim open
spaces created by technological change and aggressive marketplace
innovation by assuming favorable regulatory treatment, which the
SEC only becomes fully aware of after the practice has already been
established and when it is very hard to undo the occupation. That is
precisely what had happened in the private secondary markets, 22 and
so we thought that the similarities in these otherwise different ways of
negotiating the public-private divide were worth noting.
With the passing of the JOBS Act, our inquiry expanded. Of the
Act's various '33 Act reforms, we think that by far the most important
is the elimination of the ban on general solicitation with respect to
Rule 506 private offerings to accredited investors. Coupled with liber-
alizations in the private resale markets, this may well dramatically
change the way early-stage (and maybe even later-stage) capital raising
occurs. Thus in Part III, after briefly examining two other JOBS Act
reforms (crowdfunding and the new "Reg A+" exemption), we use the
template we develop for analyzing reverse mergers and PIPEs to test
the revised Rule 506 exemption against the concerns that underlie the
'33 Act and to question whether something important in investor pro-
tection has been lost in the process of statutory reform. As with the
transactions in Part II, we see in the new Rule 506 an absence of due
diligence obligations long thought necessary to constrain the increas-
ingly aggressive sales practices that we can expect once the ban on
general solicitation disappears.
Part IV asks whether the restraints on sales and marketing that we
have examined as part of what justifies the '33 Act might be addressed
better with a more technology-driven, forward-looking rethinking of
how we regulate sales practices in the securities industry. They would,
but this is only possible with far more regulatory resources than are
likely to be forthcoming from Congress.
I
THE MAJOR LANDMARKS AND CONTESTED TERRITORIES
A. The Securities Act of 1933
The '33 Act regulates public offerings by issuers and their affili-
ates by combining the four pillars already identified, all imposed in
response to the history of perceived abuses and havoc for investors in
22 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 13, at 385.
1578 [Vol. 98:1573
2013] REDRAWING THE PUBLICPRIVATE BOUNDARIES
the years leading up to the Great Depression.23 First, it requires the
creation of a registration statement, a public disclosure document that
reveals a great deal of information about the issuer and its capital-
raising plans.24 Second, it provides for review of the registration state-
ment by the SEC staff to ensure its quality and completeness.25 This
review is a powerful one because the issuer cannot lawfully sell its se-
curities until the registration statement becomes "effective," the tim-
ing of which is largely under bureaucratic control.26
Third, the marketing of the offering is restricted to assure that
the selling process does not get out ahead of the required disclosure
and so cause investors to commit to purchasing the newly issued secur-
ities before they have an opportunity to consider the disclosure about
the issuer and its prospects. 27 The '33 Act regulates the roles of vari-
ous intermediaries in the selling process (e.g., underwriters, account-
ants, and, more indirectly, lawyers), anticipating enhanced due
diligence that will protect investors.28 This marketing restriction is in-
tensely complicated because it tries to balance two inconsistent goals
in a very compressed time period: one, allowing the issuer and under-
writers on the selling side to build a solid book of committed investors
to price the securities accurately and limit the risk associated with the
distribution and two, simultaneously giving to the investors on the
buying side the practical ability to think through the disclosures (al-
ways a work in progress until the effective date) before committing to
the deal. Though outside the main thrust of our article, the JOBS Act
makes changes here that may turn out to be surprisingly profound.29
23 The '33 Act passed during the first hundred days of President Franklin Roosevelt's
administration. SeeJoEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 69-72
(3d ed. 2003).
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 g (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (setting out information required in a
registration statement).
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 77h (2006) (describing the effective date of a registration statement
and SEC review).
26 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.460-461 (2013) (describing agency action regarding ac-
celeration of the effective date).
27 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)-(c) (2006) (limiting offers during the prefiling period
and regulating offers during the waiting period).
28 See 15 U.S.C. §77k(b) (2006) (specifying obligations for underwriters and auditors
to avoid liability for misrepresentations in registration statements).
29 The JOBS Act seeks to facilitate public offerings by "emerging growth companies,"
a category that includes most first-time registrants. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101, 126 Stat. 306, 307 (2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(a)). One well-publicized change is the ability of such companies to "test the waters"
by approaching institutional investors prior to filing their registration statement. Another
is that brokerage firms can initiate research coverage in advance of the offering. While
that too, was well publicized, less attention has been paid to how Congress accomplished
this. Among other things, the JOBS Act changes the key definition of "offer" in section
2(a) (3) to hold that research does not constitute an offer for purposes of section 5(c). Id.
§ 105. In the same subsection, it then defines research extremely broadly to include oral,
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Finally, there is liability. In addition to the SEC's tools to police
compliance (e.g., refusals to declare a registration statement effective,
stop orders, and enforcement actions), the '33 Act creates three ex-
traordinarily powerful liability standards.30 Section 11 creates strict li-
ability for the issuer if there are material misstatements or omissions
in the registration statement when it becomes effective and due dili-
gence-based liability for other offering participants. 3' Section
12(a) (1) enforces the registration obligation and marketing restric-
tions, again strictly, against any seller.32 Section 12(a) (2) extends due
diligence-like liability to any material misrepresentations or omissions
in any selling efforts connected to the public offering.33 The public-
offering context is well suited to class action treatment, both economi-
cally and legally, so that the threat to issuers and other participants in
the distribution is particularly potent.3 4
The combination of these intense legal requirements and the
practical need to appeal to a sufficient number of investors makes a
public offering an extraordinarily stressful event. Outsiders-lawyers,
accountants, and investment bankers-temporarily gain a high de-
gree of control over the issuer to manage both deal risk and legal
risk.35 This is a rite of passage for an issuer going from private to
public as it opens itself to an unfamiliar level of external governmen-
tal and marketplace influence. In other words, these are the initial
demands of publicness.3 6
written, and electronic communications recommending the security. Id. Read literally,
that allows any broker-initiated publicity and marketing prior to the filing of a registration
statement, no matter how aggressive. We are indebted to Jim Cox for raising this point.
30 SEC tools include stop orders, injunctions, and various other remedies provided
for in the statute. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h, 77h-1, 77s, 77t (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
3I See 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (2006).
33 See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a) (2).
34 Section 11 permits any person acquiring a security covered by a registration state-
ment with a material misstatement to recover from a series of defendants with no reliance
usually required and causation or due diligence having to be shown by defendants (other
than the issuer, who is strictly liable). See 15 U.S.C. § 77L The Stanford Law School Securi-
ties Class Action Clearinghouse and Cornerstone Research reports that between eleven
and fourteen percent of federal securities class actions filed in recent years arise from
section 11. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLAss ACTION FILINGS: 2011 YEAR IN
REVIEw, 28 fig. 26 (2012), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse
research/201 12YIR/Cornerstone ResearchFilings_-201 1_YIR.pdf.
35 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 13, at 352.
36 Our use of the term "publicness" refers not only to the legal demands of registra-
tion under the '33 or '34 Acts but also the public and investor expectations that follow
from being publicly traded. See Hillary A. Sale, The New "Public" Corporation, 74 LAw &
CoNTEMip. PROBS. 137, 141, 143 (2011).
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B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Move to
Integration
At its core, the '34 Act simply extends the disclosure obligations
of companies making a public offering in order to protect sharehold-
ers trading in those securities. The overlap between the two regula-
tory regimes is palpable, and for some time it has been understood
that they ought to be integrated to the fullest extent possible. In an
influential law review article, Milton Cohen observed that the disclo-
sure requirements for American companies would look "quite differ-
ent" if the securities laws had been enacted in the opposite order or as
part of a single, integrated statute.37 Indeed, Cohen's central thesis-
that there should be a coordinated disclosure system having as its ba-
sis the requirements of the '34 Act-captured the most significant reg-
ulatory change of the modern era for securities regulation and has
remained the core tenet of American securities regulation for almost
fifty years.38
Cohen's vision necessarily contracted the impact of the disclosure
required by the '33 Act as more of the disclosure burden was carried
by the basic disclosure regime outlined in the '34 Act.3 9 Incorporat-
ing disclosures into an episodic '33 Act prospectus by reference to the
recurring '34 Act filings that a company was making on a quarterly
and annual basis became a core part of securities filings. Shelf regis-
tration further reduced the reach of '33 Act registration because the
same disclosure was already available to investors. 40 Of some impor-
tance to what will follow, the '34 Act has been permitted to do more of
the work when secondary distributions are made by selling sharehold-
ers rather than the issuer itself. Today, in other words, we have some-
thing that resembles "company registration," where seasoned issuers
that are solidly within the '34 Act system find their special obligations
under the '33 Act lightened when additional securities are sold to
public investors.
37 Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1341 (1966).
In the mid-1990s, an SEC advisory committee recommended the formalization of "com-
pany registration" in order to streamline the offering and disclosure processes. See U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CAPITAL FORMATION
AND REGULATORY PROCESSES, at ii-iii, 18-19 (1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/capform.htm (internal quotation marks omitted); John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-engineer-
ing Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1143, 1146 (1995).
38 See Coffee, supra note 37, at 1145.
39 See Cohen, supra note 37, at 1379 (stating that given coordinated disclosure with
'34 Act requirements, disclosure in a '33 Act context would be limited to "only such special
disclosures and related procedures, if any, as are needed for the special protection of offer-
ees as such").
40 See Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, Securities Act Release
No. 6334, 23 SEC Docket 387 (Aug. 18, 1981) (adopting Rule 415).
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The long-recognized challenge of this integrated regulatory sys-
tem has been that the now seemingly seamless fit of the two acts as to
disclosure was not entirely replicated with the other three traditional
methodologies of securities regulation, where the '34 Act regime had
a lighter regulatory footprint. For sure, the '34 Act also requires SEC
staff review of annual reports (and other filings, as needed) ,41 but
even now such review is not on as predictable a basis as with the public
offering. More importantly, this review lacks the leverage the SEC has
in the offering context to insist on adherence to its wishes if the issuer
wants to launch its offering on the desired timeline. 4 2 On the assump-
tion that the issuer itself is no longer selling securities, there is no
sales process to regulate through the prophylactics attendant to book-
building. Instead, the '34 Act employs a variety of tools to prohibit
fraud and manipulation by issuers and others.4 3 And it builds a com-
prehensive, multi-layered regulatory regime to address the behavior of
the institutional players who make the markets work, the broker-
dealer industry, regardless of whether the securities' issuer is public or
private. 4 4 Importantly, the role of private liability differs dramatically
between the two statutes. Although there is a great deal of '34 Act
litigation, it is largely fraud-based, requiring a showing of intentional-
ity rather than the strict or due diligence liability found in the '33
Act's express remedies.45
Perhaps because of these differences, there has been a long-
standing concern that the quality of issuer disclosure diminishes
under the '34 Act. 46 That has produced a three-decade-long effort by
Congress and the SEC to create a corporate governance infrastructure
inside public companies that compensates for the differences as to
SEC review, the role of intermediaries or gatekeepers, and liability.47
These take the form of mandatory audit committees, internal control
obligations, and a host of other interventions, many of which are the
product of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was a response to
scandalous financial misreporting at companies such as Enron and
41 See Cohen, supra note 37, at 1371-72.
42 As required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC's Corporation Finance Division
undertakes some level of review of the filings of each registrant every three years and a
significant number of registrants have their filings reviewed more frequently. See Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 104(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(b) (2006).
43 See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
44 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (authorizing SEC registration
and regulation of brokers and dealers).
45 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
46 See Coffee, supra note 37, at 1173 n.85; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Rede-
signing the SEC: Does the Treasuy Have a Better Idea, 95 VA. L. REv. 707, 755-56 (2009);
Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liability in a Continuous Dis-
closure Environment, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs 45, 46 (2000).
47 See Coffee & Sale, supra note 46, at 712, 767.
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WorldCom. 48 The accumulation of these '34 Act governance and dis-
closure obligations have become today's demands of publicness, with
intense political controversy over whether this is too much trans-
parency and accountability if we really want to promote robust capital
formation. A portion of the JOBS Act that we examine elsewhere-
the "on-ramp" for emerging growth companies-suggests that the an-
swer is partially yes.4 9
C. Restating the Law of Public and Private Offerings in an
Integrated Securities Regulation System
This extremely simplified description of the two main securities
laws is enough to set the foundation for what we will explore in the
remainder of this Article. The '34 Act provides an information-forc-
ing regime to protect investors in the trading market with a variety of
external due diligence mechanisms to bolster disclosures made by an
issuer.50 The '33 Act focuses on additional protection thought neces-
sary when there are special selling efforts, an idea about which we will
have more to say shortly.51 In each regime, publicness obligations are
removed or reduced based on various exemptions. For example, the
requirements for registered public offerings under the '33 Act do not
apply to private placements, described in the seminal Supreme Court
decision SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. as offerings made to those who, be-
cause of some combination of presumed sophistication and access to
information, can "fend for themselves."5 2 Under Rule 506 of Regula-
tion D (Reg D),53 which purports to be an interpretation of the Ral-
ston Puina standard but in fact marks a fairly radical departure in
terms of practice, an issuer can sell stock without registering it under
the '33 Act to any number of "accredited investor[s]," a category
which today includes individuals with upper-middle-class income or a
net worth over one million dollars.54 Such investors do not actually
have to be sophisticated, do not have to have a relationship with the
48 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (in) (2006).
49 Seejumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 101-108, 126 Stat.
306, 307-13 (2012) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Langevoort &
Thompson, supra note 13, at 371.
50 See Coffee, supra note 37, at 1157; Langevoort, supra note 46, at 58-59.
51 See Cohen, supra note 37, at 1385-86 ("A different sort of pragmatic answer is that
'selling' plays a greater role in typical public offerings than in trading transactions, and a
prescribed prospectus is the best means of assuring truth in sales literature. ... Moreover,
the issuer (and, by extension, the affiliate) is here wearing two hats, as a seller of securities
and as the main source of relevant disclosures, so that there may be special temptations to
favor the selling role at the expense of the disclosing one.").
52 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
53 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).
54 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (a) (5) (2012) (defining accredited investor to include
"[a] ny natural person" whose net worth, combined with a spouse's but exclusive of home
equity, exceeds one million dollars).
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issuer, and do not have to receive any disclosure from the issuer.5 5
The result was to push back the line of a public offering and permit
more sales (and resales) to occur without the core regulatory protec-
tions of the '33 Act or the '34 Act. Such changes reflected the deregu-
latory era and greater trust in markets that took hold in the early
1980s and thereafter, and there was a sense that the self-cleansing na-
ture of markets would permit a lighter regulatory touch.5 6 We come
back to this in Part III to consider what the JOBS Act has done with
respect to Reg D offerings to accredited investors.57
Other exemptions come with more strings attached. This takes
us back to Cohen, who also sought to change the approach to concep-
tualizing the boundary of '33 Act regulation.5 8 He advocated for mov-
ing beyond the historical "all or nothing" approach of '33 Act
coverage by implementing a middle category of regulation that tied
the disclosure requirements to the size of the offering.5 9 When the
Reg D exemptions from '33 Act registration were promulgated in the
early 1980s, for example, companies raising smaller amounts of
money from nonaccredited investors faced lighter regulatory burdens,
but still significant obligations, in order to gain exempt status.6 0 This
was true of Regulation A (Reg A) as well, which created a simplified
registration system through which small offerings could be made (also
expanded significantly in the JOBS Act).61
The '34 Act traditionally has used different metrics for determin-
ing what companies have disclosure obligations, focusing on the com-
pany's size as measured by its number of shareholders and assets
rather than the qualitative investor characteristics or the scaled ap-
proach to regulation seen in the '33 Act space; those measures of ac-
tively traded securities defined the companies that would have to meet
the main disclosure requirements of the securities laws. 6 2 The JOBS
Act enacts a remarkable transformation in moving the two acts closer
together in terms of their approach to boundaries. It inserts the inves-
tor qualification approach from the '33 Act into the '34 Act by making
55 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(b)(1)-(b)(2)(i), .506(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (2012).
56 See Coffee & Sale, supra note 46, at 714.
57 Regulation A, authorizing a mini-registration, was first adopted in 1936. See Securi-
ties Act Release Nos. 627-32, 1936 WL 30895 to 30900 (Jan. 21, 1936). See infra notes
164-67 for a discussion of the new Regulation "A+" authorized by the JOBS Act.
58 See Cohen supra note 37, at 1349.
59 Id. His approach was to be "entirely apart from the disclosure system of the 1934
Act." Id. at 1350.
60 See Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,252 (Mar. 16, 1982)
(adopting Reg D); Securities Act Release No. 6339, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,795 (Aug. 18,
1981) (proposing Reg D).
61 See Securities Act Release Nos. 627-32, 1936 WL 30895 to 30900 (Jan. 21, 1936).
62 See Cohen, supra note 37, at 1367-68 (describing the '34 Act as implementing a
"continuous disclosure system ... designed for the benefit of investors and potential inves-
tors in all securities in which there is an active, continuous market interest").
1584 [Vol. 98:1573
2013] REDRAWING THE PUBLIC-PRTVATE BOUNDARIES
it possible for companies to avoid reporting-company obligations mea-
sured not just by the number of investors who may be trading the
stock but also by whether they are accredited investors.63 And the
on-ramp provisions of the JOBS Act illustrate a massive scaling of '34
Act obligations for emerging growth companies that expands on the
sort of scaling long used in the '33 Act.64
We focus here on the '33 Act exemptions as expanded after the
JOBS Act and on the transitional territory at the boundary of the '33
and '34 Acts. Our methodology is fairly straightforward. For each of
these settings, we ask about each of the four features of securities reg-
ulation described earlier: disclosure content, SEC review, restrictions
on sales pressure, and liability, especially with respect to the ability to
force due diligence. Where one or more of these features is compro-
mised or abandoned to facilitate some kind of transaction, we ask,
why? Are we comfortable with what compensates for the loss (whether
it comes through conditions attached to an exemption or the hoped-
for presence of '34 Act regulation)? These may seem like obvious
questions to ask, but as we noted earlier, so many innovations in secur-
ities law emerge haphazardly, with occupations of newly created space
only getting sustained, formal SEC attention later on and even then
only incrementally. If so, these kinds of questions are never asked and
answered systematically.
We also need to ask a more fundamental question about the in-
terplay between the '33 and '34 Acts that will be key to all that follows:
Once we assume the basic information-forcing presence of the '34 Act
to help buyers or sellers of securities in ordinary trading transactions,
why should we add the heavy additional regulation associated with the
'33 Act? The self-interest of the issuer in the success of its capital
raise, which tempts it to cheat, provides a starting point, but we doubt
that self-interest alone suffices as an explanation. After all, there are
temptations to cheat on the part of managers in the form of stock
options as well as other incentives that are strong even when the issuer
is not selling any stock. Our sense is that there is something to be
gained by looking at the opposite side of the coin. Where sales by an
issuer, underwriters, or affiliates could be absorbed by buyers without
any special soliciting efforts, we doubt there would be the need for
heavy-handed regulation stemming from the temptation alone-per-
haps no more than a public announcement that the issuer is selling
coupled with the mandatory disclosure that the '34 Act demands.
What makes a public offering special in terms of investor protection is
the business-driven need to induce increased demand so as to absorb
63 SeeJumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306,
325 (2012) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1) (A)).
64 SeeJumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 101-108.
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a large number of shares suddenly coming to market-work typically
done by financial intermediaries (underwriters and dealers). It is the
combination of that need and the issuer's self-interest that justifies the
registration requirement.
We can see this idea in section 4(a) (4) of the '33 Act, exempting
ordinary trading transactions from registration. 6 5 It is also apparent
in Rule 144's "dribble out" process, which limits sales by control per-
sons to finite batches without any unusual sales effortS6 6 and about
which we have more to say later on. Were we to restate the law of
public versus private offerings, we would say that the '33 Act is about
regulating issuer or affiliate sales that are likely to result in a "dump"
that will require special soliciting efforts, with the potential for abuse
that entails.67 And if that is right, then we will need to pay special
attention to the third and fourth features of the '33 Act: sales-practice
regulation and liability. The first of these is self-evident, the second
more subtle. Of course antifraud liability addresses the most obvious
forms of cheating in the offering process. But to the extent that liabil-
ity under the '33 Act forces external due diligence, the selling process
is affected as well. If lawyers representing directors, placement agents,
and brokers feel pressure to dig more deeply into issuer quality, inno-
cent, careless, or willfully blind misrepresentation by salespeople pre-
sumably becomes less likely.
Our impression is that this is what is most easily lost in the hybrid
settings that we are about to explore. For example, trading markets
can be created via reverse merger without the due diligence that a '33
Act rite of passage entails and in the absence of '34 Act protections
that provide equivalent diligence. Public companies squeeze their
capital-raising transactions somewhat awkwardly into an ostensibly '34
Act setting to reduce liability (and the due diligence that will follow
from that). With the integration of the two Acts, more transactions
are covered by the '34 Act, and more importantly, there are more
spaces for special selling efforts with the less intense '34 Act regula-
tion. To us, this is especially interesting territory, and we examine it
in Part II. There are more similarities to these hybrid settings than
first meet the eye, which help us theorize about the borders separat-
ing the two acts.
Part III is where we turn to the new world of private placements
after the JOBS Act, in which far more aggressive advertising and mar-
65 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
66 SeeJAMEs D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 362-72 (6th
ed. 2009).
67 See Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Law of Private
Placements (Non-Public Offerings) Not Entitled to Benefits of Safe Harbors-A Report, 66 Bus. L.
85, 86 (2010). Our point is not to take anything as given and instead to ask why we should
have something more than '34 Act-style company registration.
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keting is permitted under the '33 Act as issuers and their agents pros-
pect for accredited investors without the due diligence requirements
that exist elsewhere in the '33 Act space. In contrast to reverse merg-
ers or PIPEs, this occurs without any regulatory oversight at all. And
after the Supreme Court's unexpected decision in Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co. in 1995, the diligence-forcing liability prong of securities regula-
tion has been withdrawn as to these issuances because the Court lim-
ited section 12(a) (2)'s negligence-based policing of misstatements
and omissions in selling material to transactions characterized as pub-
lic offerings (though not necessarily registered ones).68 Truly private
offerings become "fraud-only," so that there is less incentive for any
serious rite of passage. Publicness obligations are put off into the fu-
ture, arising only if and when the issuer separately triggers one of the
'34 Act definitions for public company status. And as noted, entering
into the '34 Act space is not quite the same as the '33 Act rite of pas-
sage. The Supreme Court's opinion has been heavily criticized by
many academics.69 There have been efforts to reverse Gustafson
through legislation, thus far unsuccessful. 70 By illustrating its effect in
three settings that are significant for transactions, part of our account
here is meant to support a continuation of that effort, which becomes
all the more important as technology creates more and more "private"
capital-raising opportunities that look like de facto public offerings.
In all of this, we acknowledge that we have largely assumed-not
demonstrated-that '33 Act interventions like registration, disclosure,
due diligence, and liability generate significant benefits for investors,
benefits that exceed their costs. 71 As we stated at the outset, our effort
here is to remap the boundaries of the '33 Act in light of what has
changed recently and not to ask, even though it is a perfectly legiti-
mate question, whether the '33 Act works well as applied to the base-
line offerings, IPOs. Our sense is that the statutory foundation-
68 513 U.S. 561, 581-82 (1995). There are, however, FINRA obligations regarding
diligence in private placements. See infra notes 199, 234.
69 Edmund Kitch calls it an opinion that does "not write," lacking in any logical pro-
gression of thought. See Edmund W. Kitch, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: An Opinion that Did Not
Write, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 99.
70 See, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. S3566 (daily ed. May 11, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl
Levin), 2010 WL 1873206.
71 This was the challenge to the '33 Act of the first generation of law and economics
scholars. E.g., GeorgeJ. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37J. Bus. 117, 124
(1964). For a more contemporary discussion, see Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities
Regulation, 47 J. Accr. REs. 391, 392 (2009). Adam Pritchard, responding in part to an
earlier version of our paper, suggests the abolition of the IPO in favor of a model that
forces new entrants to the public market to become seasoned in a private trading market
for a period of time. See Adam C. Pritchard, Facebook, the JOBS Act, and Abolishing IPOs,
REGULATION, Fall 2012, at 17. And in helpful comments on this article, Anna Pinedo ob-
served that the registered IPO is currently under transformation toward more "private-
ness," the mirror image of what we are discussing here.
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though surely in need of some updating-is fundamentally sound,
and we could point to plenty of indirect evidence in that direction but
leave to the side this largely empirical question.72 So, too, will we
leave largely unaddressed what some deeply conservative critics of gov-
ernmental regulation say: that it is illegitimate to spend public re-
sources to protect competent adults from their own foolish economic
choices, especially if the burdens fall on potentially productive eco-
nomic activity.73 We are quite sure that some of the push for the
JOBS Act reflects that ideology, more than just the instrumental pur-
suit of capital formation orjob creation, and that securities regulation
will be struggling with this ideological battle for some time to come.
II
HYBRID TRANSACTIONS
The integration of the '33 and '34 Act regulatory systems over the
last half century created opportunities for issuers to structure transac-
tions that skip the usual rite of passage of a registered public offering
under the '33 Act, arbitraging the differences in regulation under the
two Acts. This Part discusses two examples of current interest where
we think a better understanding of the theory underlying the line be-
tween public and private in securities regulation obligations-particu-
larly the emphasis on sales pressure-would help formulate a sensible
policy.
A. Reverse Mergers
"Shell games" have plagued securities regulation for half a cen-
tury. Using an issuer with little or no assets or operations as a back-
72 For a recent survey of the evidence favoring regulation, see Frank B. Cross & Rob-
ert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28 CARDozo L. REv. 333, 337
(2006). For a discussion of regulation predating the U.S. experience and with useful litera-
ture citations, see Carsten Burhop et al., Regulating IPOs: Evidence from Going Public in
London and Berlin, 1900-1913, 3 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1884190.
73 We regard this as the somewhat easier response: Even putting aside the felt need to
protect some investors who might be particularly vulnerable, efficient regulation enhances
the likelihood of investment (and hence capital formation) as compared to a world in
which rational investors are left to their own resources to separate the good fruit from the
lemons. That is often too costly and would thus lead to systematic underinvestment. See,
e.g., Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., &
Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of
John C. Coates IV, Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School). Instrumentalist
conservatives immersed in the field tend to accept the desirability in theory of some regula-
tion on these grounds even though they doubt the ability of the government to deliver
efficient solutions. E.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency
Problems, 62 U. CM. L. REv. 1047, 1048 (1995). On how well the history of the '33 Act's
origins fits with all this, see Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of
1933, 30J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 30-31 (2001).
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door mechanism by which a private (largely unknown) issuer becomes
publicly tradable has tempted issuers and promoters as a way of bypas-
sing the '33 Act registration process. In the early days, spin-offs (i.e.,
in-kind distributions of securities to an existing shareholder base)
were the chosen route;74 more recently, the reverse merger has been
the preferred vehicle.75 The frequency with which Chinese compa-
nies have used the reverse-merger process to enter U.S. markets has
gained headlines along with concerns-and regulatory enforce-
ment-about risks to investors.7 6 Even putting aside this global-reach
phenomenon, reverse mergers have become a common transaction,
rivaling if not exceeding the number of registered public offerings in
a given year.7 7
Reverse mergers can take a number of forms, but all share the
same theme7 8 : a private company directly or indirectly merges into a
shell company that has established itself as a public issuer under the
'34 Act.79 The shell may have been incubated for this purpose, or it
may be the ghost of a once-active public company that has ceased op-
erations but still has shares outstanding. Once this transaction is com-
plete, the shell provides the legal identity for the private company;
74 See Cox ET AL., supra note 66, at 399-404. The term "reverse merger" refers to a
larger number of transactions than simply those involving shells. For example, there have
been many instances where the private issuer merges into a smaller (but active) public
company in order to take on its public status, perhaps (but not necessarily) later spinning
off those activities so that the surviving company is identical to the formerly private com-
pany. For a study that focuses on this broader array of reverse mergers, see Kimberly C.
Gleason et al., Alternatives for Going Public: Evidence from Reverse Takeovers, Self-Undentritten
IPOs, and Traditional IPOs, FIN. DECISIONs 2 (Summer 2008), http://www.financialdecisions
online.org/current/GleasonJainRosenthal.pdf. Famously, the NYSE went public by acquir-
ing a smaller but publicly traded trading platform, Archipelago. See Stephen Taub, NYSE
Goes Public, Goes Electronic, CFO.com (April 21, 2005), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/
3903963?f=related (describing the deal as a reverse merger where the NYSE shed its not for
profit form).
7 On the mechanics of reverse mergers, see generally DAVID N. FELDMAN, REVERSE
MERGERS AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL IPOs (2d ed. 2009); Sjostrom, Truth
About Reverse Mergers, supra note 21, at 743-44.
76 E.g., David Barboza & Azam Ahmed, A Thorn for Chinese Companies, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2011, at B5; Nanette Byrnes & Lynnley Browning, China's Shortcut to Wall Street, REUTERS,
Aug. 1, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-shell-china-
idUSTRE7702S520110801 (stating that since 2002, more than four hundred private Chi-
nese companies used reverse mergers with U.S. shells and noting that, through July 2011,
the cumulative loss in market capitalization among these companies exceeded eighteen
billion dollars). There is some research, on the other hand, suggesting that these losses
are not out of line with reverse-merger risks generally. See Charles M.C. Lee et al., Shell
Games: Are Chinese Reverse Merger Firms Inherently Toxic? 5-6 (Nov. 6, 2012) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at https://ssm.com/abstract=2155425.
77 See C6cile Carpentier et al., The Value of Capital Market Regulation: IPOs Versus Reverse
Mergers, 9J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 56, 57 (2012) (noting that from 2004-2008 there were
1065 reverse mergers in the U.S. compared to 672 registered IPOs).
78 See SEC Investor Bulletin: Reverse Mergers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (June 9, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reversemergers.pdf.
79 See, e.g., Carpentier et al., supra note 77, at 60-61.
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this means that the private company stands in the shoes of the public
company so far as both the trading market and financial reporting
obligations are concerned. The private company has thus become
public, bringing a newfound liquidity for investors once any resale re-
strictions lapse, without any change in control.s0
While these transactions are sometimes promoted as ways of "go-
ing public" without '33 Act registration burdens, there is an obvious
difference: in a reverse merger, the private company does not raise
any capital in the process81 but instead suffers significant shareholder
dilution in terms of the value transferred to the shell and its promoter
for their services (plus other costs and expenses). However, the re-
verse merger may set the stage (though by no means necessarily) for a
subsequent round of simplified public financing-typically in the
form of a PIPE transaction, which is available only to '34 Act regis-
trants82 and to which we turn next.
The economics of reverse mergers are worth pondering. At first
glance, reverse mergers with empty shells seem nonsensical-sham
transactions designed simply to avoid regulation.83 But a handful of
studies of reverse mergers show that the shell marketplace is popu-
lated by some promoters who are repeat players and raise capital from
specialized shell investors who demand (and receive) significant re-
turns in the face of high risk.84 Arguably, the most successful shell
80 A variation on this is the "special purpose acquisition corporation" (SPAC), which
is a shell company that raises funds in a registered public offering and then seeks out
another company to acquire through a reverse merger. The economics of this arrange-
ment are quite different from the kinds of reverse mergers we are focusing on because
transactions involving SPACs anticipate a control shift to the SPAC shareholders. In es-
sence, they are private-equity-type arrangements with public trading. A recent study of
SPACs calls them "reverse mergers 'done right.'" See Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller,
Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of SPA Cs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 878 (2013); see
also Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capita4 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 172, 224-28 (dis-
cussing SPACs and calling them "a species of private equity"). The differences are such
that they deserve distinct treatment, which is outside the scope of our Article, but we note
that there is a potential for regulatory arbitrage parallel to what we have been discussing.
In the SPAC transaction, the core information for investors will be disclosed in the proxy
disclosure attendant to the shareholder vote rather than in the registered public offering
when the funds are initially raised. The result is less intense '34 Act disclosure, due dili-
gence, and liability for the deal.
81 See Sjostrom, Truth About Reverse Mergers, supra note 21, at 757-59.
82 PIPE financing follows a significant percentage of reverse mergers. SeeJeffJoseph,
IPO Alternatives: Reverse Mergers, ADVISORONE (May 1, 2008), http://www.advisorone.com/
2008/05/01/ipo-alternatives-reverse-mergers. The newly public company can also make
acquisitions, using the public shares as currency.
83 For a fairly critical perspective along these lines, see 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL &
SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 6.69 (2012).
84 See loannis V. Floros & Kuldeep Shastri, A Comparison of Penny Stock Initial Pub-
lic Offerings and Reverse Mergers as Alternative Mechanisms for Going Public 31-32 (Aug.
24, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractjid=1460979.
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promoters will be those skilled at identifying emerging companies
that, in the face of considerable informational asymmetry, have poten-
tial, even if success is a long shot.85 Much like investment bankers or
venture capitalists, they act as reputational intermediaries, with the
same (imperfect) constraints on opportunism as a result.86
But nothing limits the reverse merger market to this high-end
segment, and on the more troubling side we have the concerns of
both problematic disclosure and sales pressure.8 7 The liquidity de-
mands that the existing private-company shareholders-particularly
controlling shareholders-bring to the transaction are coupled with
the likely desire of the shell promoter and associates to exit as soon as
possible.88 This may call for aggressive sales practices, perhaps of the
boiler room variety, designed to pump up the price of the securities
by stimulating enough demand to absorb the large impending dump.
It is likely that a sample of reverse mergers at any given time will fall
along a continuum whereby the better reverse-merger candidates util-
ize intermediaries who can signal the legitimacy of the deal, while
lesser candidates are left to the less savory reputational end of the
marketplace.
Therein we find a fascinating regulatory challenge. What empiri-
cal evidence there is suggests that reverse mergers are highly risky-
one study suggests that some forty-two percent of reverse merger com-
panies were delisted within three years 89-and that retail investors do
not distinguish as well as they should when faced with reverse merg-
ers. In a Canadian study, the average returns on a portfolio of reverse-
merger securities were significantly less than on a basket of IPO-regis-
tered securities, indicating that investors do not sufficiently adjust the
price they are willing to pay to reflect the increased risk.90 By con-
trast, the U.S. approach tolerates backdoor registration but with en-
85 See loannis V. Floros & Travis R.A. Sapp, Shell Games: On the Value of Shell Companies,
17 J. CoRP. FIN. 850, 865-66 (2011).
86 See id. at 866.
87 See Bill Alpert & Leslie P. Norton, Beware this Chinese Export, BARRONS, Aug. 30,
2010, at 21 (discussing how Chinese companies circumventing the IPO process "fall be-
tween the cracks of market regulation"). Proponents of reverse mergers concede this "bad
guy" phenomenon but emphasize that nearly all deal structures can be abused, especially
when there is inadequate policing. See FELDMAN, supra note 75, at 107-21; David Feldman,
Chairman Schapiro: Please Don't Decimate Small Company Finance, REVERSE MERGER & SPAC
BLOG (July 3, 2011, 9:56 AM), www.reversemergerblog.com/2011/07/03.
88 See Floros & Sapp, supra note 85, at 851.
89 See Frederick Adjei et al., The Determinants and Survival of Reverse Mergers vs IPOs, 32
J. EcoN. & FIN. 176, 189 (2008).
90 See C~cile Carpentier & Jean-Marc Suret, Entrepreneurial Equity Financing and Securi-
ties Regulation: An Empirical Analysis, 30 INT'L SIMALL Bus. J. 41, 55 (2012); see also Carpentier
et al., supra note 77, at 58 (noting that investors "involved in IPOs and [reverse mergers]




hanced regulatory protections. There are probably many reasons for
this, including the legal metaphysics of assessing whether the issuer or
its affiliates are disposing of securities "for value" in the course of the
transaction, a statutory trigger for the '33 Act registration require-
ment.9' But case law from the early days of shells and spin-offs sug-
gests a liberal reading of the value requirement that does not insist on
paid-in consideration. 92 The SEC probably could do more to clamp
down on this market if it wanted. Its uneasy tolerance no doubt re-
flects a mix of political pressure-the reverse-merger market is lucra-
tive and has some strong proponents-and some intuition that there
are benefits to leaving the back door ajar.
It is this last point that we want to think about here because if it is
true, it says something important about the current regulatory struc-
ture at the intersection of the '33 and '34 Acts. Describing the current
regulatory philosophy toward reverse mergers (which is currently be-
ing rethought yet again in light of the problems with Chinese compa-
nies9 3 ) is difficult-there are a large number of unanswered questions
lurking due to the doctrinal complications mentioned above. By and
large, the SEC has been willing to let the '34 Act do the work for
reverse mergers without the additional discipline provided by the '33
Act rite of passage. In 2005, the SEC revised its Form 8-K require-
ments (imposing "current" reporting obligations in advance of 10-Qs
or 10-Ks) to describe the material terms of the transaction and trans-
form the inert public shell into a completely new, active issuer, along
with financial statements and pro forma financial information with re-
spect to the newly combined entities.94 Other rules scattered through-
out the '33 and '34 Acts put additional speed bumps into place where
shell-company transactions are involved.95 By most accounts, the re-
verse-merger environment improved as a result.
Yet, there are important differences in reverse-merger companies
from other issuers who come under the '34 Act. For example, there is
no negotiation as to the disclosure with the SEC at the time of the
transaction and it is unclear how many reverse-merger companies re-
ally get a serious "gatekeeper" checkup.9 6 From an accounting stand-
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a) (3) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (defining the sale of securities to
include "sale or disposition .. . for value").
92 See SEC v. Datronics Eng'rs, Inc., 490 F.2d 250, 253-54 (4th Cir. 1973).
93 See Aguilar, supra note 19.
94 See SEC, FORM 8-K, items 2.01 (f), 5.01 (a) (8), available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/form8-k.pdf- 3A BLOOMENTHAL & WOLF, supra note 83, at §§ 6:70-6:71.
95 See, e.g., SEC Rule 144(i)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(i)(1)(i) (2013) (disqualifica-
tion for a "business combination related shell company"); SIMON M. LORNE &JOY MARLENE
BRYAN, AcQuISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED TRANsACrIONs § 3:11.15
(2012).
96 The SEC indicated that it was stepping up its review, at least as to Chinese
reverse-merger companies. It has also approved new exchange listing requirements limit-
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point, this has been a principal concern of the SEC with respect to
some of the Chinese reverse mergers, where audits that satisfy the
basics of independent oversight have not occurred. But that particu-
lar worry exists because of the extraterritorial nature of the transac-
tion and the global outsourcing of the audit work.97
More profoundly, what '33 Act registration adds to this rite of
passage is discipline, both ex ante and ex post. Among the gatekeep-
ers in nearly all registered IPOs are the underwriters, who have their
own lawyers. The underwriters take on responsibility for selling the
securities and have powerful (if not lock-tight) reputational incentives
not to take a company public if it will be exposed as a fraud in the not
too distant future.98 And this incentive, of course, is reinforced by
section 11, which creates liability on the part of underwriters to pur-
chasers for any failures of due diligence in the preparation of the re-
quired disclosures in the registration statement.99 Similar liability
faces the board of directors, nondirector signatories of the registra-
tion statement, and the auditors; the issuer itself faces strict liability
for any material misstatements or omissions.100 The result is fairly
thorough diligence in investigating the truth behind the issuer's
representations.
The '34 Act environment is different. At the federal level, private
liability is scienter based, a much more difficult showing for plain-
tiffs.101 To be sure, the SEC has a variety of enforcement tools that
can be put to work for disclosure failures in the reverse-merger set-
ting, even without a showing of deliberate misconduct on the part of
the issuer or the promoters, and so do FINRA and securities ex-
changes on which reverse merger shares might be traded. 0 2 Broker-
dealers may not recommend any security to a customer unless they
have come to "know" the security through at least minimal (albeit
ing the accessibility of reverse-merger firms. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Approves New Rules to Toughen Listing Standards for Reverse Merger Companies (Nov. 9,
2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-235.htm (describing SEC approval of
rules for listing markets that toughened standards for firms to be listed via reverse
mergers).
97 See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., AcriviTy SUMMARY AND AUDIT IMPLICA-
TIONs FOR REVERSE MERGERS INVOLVING COMPANIES FROM THE CHINA REGION: JANUARY 1,
2007 THROUGH MARCH 31, 2010, at 7-8 (2011), available at http://pcaobus.org/research/
documents/chinese-reverse.merger.research note.pdf.
98 See Cox ET AL., supra note 66, at 116-35 (describing the role of underwriters).
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
100 See id.
101 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (requiring scienter for a
lOb-5 action); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
102 See FINRA RULE 2310(b) (3), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display-main.html?rbid=2403&elementjid=8469 (requiring reasonable grounds to believe
that all material facts are adequately and accurately disclosed).
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maybe fairly superficial) diligence. 03 All these rules could produce
some degree of due diligence, but it is not clear that they do so con-
sistently enough. Given that action is highly unlikely with respect to
relatively small-scale distributions that are not directly in the regula-
tors' line of sight, discipline can easily become lax. At the low end of
the spectrum, where reputational incentives are already weak, disci-
pline can be nonexistent. This is one place that Gustafson had a par-
ticularly distressing effect. 10 4
So what would an optimal reverse merger policy be? We should
start with the obvious: the reverse merger is just a form of regulatory
arbitrage. No economic value is added by the artificial process of
combining with a public shell that may not be readily accomplished by
more direct means-it is just that the regulatory burdens are reduced
because of shell formalism. To the extent that reverse mergers are a
gateway to the simplified financing available only to public compa-
nies, voluntary-filer status serves the same purpose. To the extent that
the reverse merger is a way of quickly pushing out securities to create
more liquidity for trading in the issuer's stock, this is ordinarily done
under much more controlled circumstances-a registered public of-
fering, or a Reg D or Reg A transaction. The question is really
whether the SEC ought to create an exemption for large-scale secon-
dary sales of issuer securities promptly upon gaining '34 Act public-
company status.
We suspect that the answer is yes but with conditions relating to
both timing and volume-a Rule 144 -style solution.105 Indeed, we
think that the proper policy as to what constitutes a public offering is
better gleaned not so much from Ralston Puina and its long and tor-
tured legacy but from the intricate law and lore on the meaning of
"underwriter." Students new to securities regulation struggle-albeit
profitably-with what it means for an intermediary to buy from an
issuer or affiliate with a view toward a distribution.1 0 6 So what is a
distribution? The case law references Ralston-and that does become
the gateway to Rule 144A and "4(11/2)" transactions-but SEC policy
has a somewhat different emphasis as it plays out in Rule 144.107 Re-
sales can take place either by limiting the amount and sales pressure
103 See Cox ET AL., supra note 66, at 1031-36 (discussing the duty of a broker-dealer to
conduct independent analysis on recommended securities).
104 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570-71 (1995) (holding that section 12
liability does not apply to private, secondary transactions).
105 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2013) (providing safe harbor for resale of restricted securi-
ties based on holding period and for resales on behalf of affiliates based on limited num-
ber of shares sold if done only in a broker's transaction).
106 See Cox ET AL., supra note 66, at 345-62 (discussing the inclusion of anyone who
"purchased from an issuer with a view to ... [a] distribution" in the statutory definition of
an "underwriter" and its effect on the purchaser (internal quotation marks omitted)).
107 See id. (discussing the adoption of Rule 144 and its relationship with the case law).
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associated with the resales and insisting on a relatively fresh informa-
tional environment (in the case of transactions by the issuer's control
persons), or by implementing a long-enough holding period (in the
case of transactions by others who have bought from the issuer with-
out '33 Act registration). 108 The holding period in the latter context
was reset after the 2007 amendments to the rule: generally, the period
became one year for securities of private companies and six months
for public companies. 09 Importantly, Rule 144(i) creates stricter
rules for resales of restricted securities in the aftermath of a shell com-
pany transaction like a reverse merger by generally setting the holding
period at one year, in effect treating these resales as if they were made
for shares in a company that was not a '34 Act reporting company.'10
There are three questions here; one conceptual, another legal,
and the last empirical. First, one of the great and largely unremarked-
upon (at least by academics) developments in '33 Act theory has been
the step-by-step shortening of the Rule 144 holding period. Initially, it
was three years for nonaffiliates or two for affiliates.' For some time,
resellers could "dribble out" the securities under controlled condi-
tions.112 After a quarter century went by, it was reduced to two or one
years, respectively." 3 In 2007, it became one year or six months.' 1 4
This is not just technical. The conceptual question posed is this:
Assume an issuer wants to raise a significant amount of capital. One
alternative is a registered public offering, with the attendant costs and
burdens. Another is a Rule 144A deal that stays within the closed
Qualified Institutional Buyer (QIB) network." 5 A third is a private
placement to accredited investors (e.g., hedge funds) with the expec-
tation that these securities will be sold freely-maybe aggressively-as
soon as the Rule 144 holding period expires. Obviously, a period of
two or three years is a lengthy time for the securities to be at rest; six
108 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (providing a safe harbor for those who might be considered
underwriters because they sell for an issuer or control person in connection with a
distribution).
109 See COX ET AL., supra note 66, at 363-68 (discussing the 2007 amendments); see also
infra note 194 and accompanying text (noting changes to the holding period).
110 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(i).
111 See Notice of Adoption of Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 5223, 1972 WL
121583 at *16 (Jan. 11, 1972) (adopting Rule 144 with holding periods reflecting prior
case law).
112 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e), (g), (h) (1973). The rule permits sales of the greater of
the average weekly volume of shares traded or one percent of the outstanding stock if sold
in a broker's transaction only.
"13 See Revision of Holding Period Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 7390, 63
SEC Docket 2078 (Feb. 20, 1997).
114 See Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 8869, 92 SEC Docket
110 (Dec. 6, 2007).
115 See Cox ET AL., supra note 66, at 374--80 (discussing Rule 144A's safe harbor and its
QIB restriction). QIBs are financial institutions with more than one hundred million dol-
lars under management. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a) (1) (i) (2013).
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months or a year, not so much. One has to ask if we are not close to,
if not at, a point at which it will be seriously tempting for in-
termediaries to take on that limited holding period (perhaps with
some hedging of the risk) if there are no limits or restrictions-other
than antifraud rules-on the dump that takes place thereafter. If so,
that could be one more nail in the coffin of the registered public of-
fering and the demise of the protections supposedly afforded by the
'33 Act.
In particular, what is now missing with respect to nonaffiliate
transactions is the dribble out which provides a period during which
only limited amounts of securities could be resold and only through
brokers prohibited from using any special solicitation efforts.' 16 This
allows for the gradual absorption of the stock before the holding pe-
riod runs out entirely and a check on overly aggressive sales practices.
The legal question relates to who, among those involved in the
reverse merger, has to lock up their shares for whatever period of time
Rule 144 specifies? Because the shell's acquisition of the private com-
pany is typically done pursuant to a private placement exemption, the
new shares held by the private company's former shareholders are re-
stricted and thus not immediately resalable.117 As to other partici-
pants, the law is more complicated. The SEC has been relatively
successful in court in holding shell promoters as underwriters when
they try to dump too quickly,"i8 but compliance in this area is
questionable.119
That leads to the empirical question: What kind of aggressive sell-
ing does take place immediately after a reverse merger, and by whom?
We are not aware of good data on this question and so can only specu-
late and refer to anecdotal evidence. One possibility is that the red
flags of underwriter status are often ignored in this under-policed
neighborhood, and those close to the transaction are causing rapid
selling to occur notwithstanding the section 5 risks. Another is that
the selling efforts shift to the periphery, with the pumping done by
technically unaffiliated parties who nonetheless may be acting in con-
cert with shadier shell promoters on some kind of quid pro quo basis.
Clarity alone is unlikely to be enough to stem the kind of sales
pressure that is likely to build up in lower-quality offerings. Again, we
116 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (2012) (applying volume limitations only in the case of
affiliates).
117 See Sjostrom, Truth About Reverse Mergers, supra note 21, at 747-48 (describing the
resulting Rule 506 shares of a typical reverse merger as restricted securities).
118 See, e.g., SEC v. M&A West Inc., 538 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (refusing to
allow tacking); SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing resale of
control person securities).
119 See Sjostrom, Truth About Reverse Mergers, supra note 21, at 746-47 (describing a
typical reverse merger).
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are dealing with a fairly opaque, retail-oriented marketplace that is
likely to break into segments that include large numbers of unsophis-
ticated investors. That quality can be signaled to some investors does
not mean that lemons cannot be sold to others. The question to ask is
whether some of the practices associated with '33 Act registration can
be imported into this setting while keeping in mind that this is not an
issuer capital-raising transaction and should not be regulated as such.
We would suggest a "Form RM" to be filed by the public shell in
advance of the completion of a reverse merger. Again, there is no
significant economic value in a reverse merger with a shell company
except to the extent that the shell operates as a signaling device,
which it cannot do unless it has come to know its merger partner fairly
thoroughly. We will take it as true that high-quality, reverse-merger
transactions have substantial due diligence built into the timetable. If
so, it makes sense to require the shell and its promoter to represent
that they: (a) have made a reasonable investigation into the private
company in anticipation of the transaction; (b) are not aware of mate-
rial facts casting doubt on the accuracy of the information contained
therein; and (c) believe that the information fairly presents the finan-
cial condition of the company. The SEC could flesh out its view of
what such an investigation should entail, possibly incorporating stan-
dards reflecting industry best practices. Form RM would then become
one of the necessary inputs with respect to recommendations and
sales by other broker-dealers under Rule 15c2-11120 and its FINRA
complement with respect to reverse-merger-initiated transactions. 121
Because of the opacity of low-end trading markets, this kind of
intervention could not hope to be successful without some step up in
accountability. This has long proved elusive for the SEC itself and
FINRA, and hence some increase in private litigation exposure seems
warranted. The due diligence representation helps investors by giving
them a Rule lOb-5 action for material misdescriptions of the quality of
the diligence or other forms of "intentional carelessness." The repre-
sentation by the shell promoter (not just the shell) is also important
following the Supreme Court's recent Janus Capital case, which in-
troduces a particularly severe formalism into the question of who is
responsible for misstatements in a mandatory disclosure document
filed under the name of a particular entity. 122 This is also a place
where some restoration of section 12(a) (2) liability would help.
120 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (2012).
121 FINRA, FORM 211, available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/
MarketTransparency/OTCBB/Forms/ (notifying issuers of information that broker-dealer
must have in its possession before posting quotes for issuer's stock).
122 SeeJanus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2306 (2011)
(holding that the only person who "makes" a misstatement is one with ultimate legal au-
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We should note that the Chinese reverse-merger phenomenon
has led to additional regulatory change, though not in the form sug-
gested here. The most highly publicized failures involved issuers who
listed on a U.S. exchange promptly upon completion of the reverse
merger. This was a reputational issue, particularly for NASDAQ,
which, together with the other major exchanges, amended its listing
standards in November 2011 (upon SEC approvall 23) to make listing
more difficult via this technique. This revision may well be a potent
short-term response but we doubt it is a long-term solution given the
rapid evolution of alternative trading markets and pressure on listing
standards generally as a protective device. We suspect that reverse
mergers will remain both practically significant and a challenge to ef-
fective regulation.
B. PIPEs
Reverse mergers are sometimes gateways to capital-raising trans-
actions by the private companies that have now become public
through legal alchemy; PIPE financing is a standard transactional
mechanism for many of those that do.124 But PIPEs are important for
issuer capital raising well beyond this one context. As the recent fi-
nancial crisis showed, PIPE financing can be the deal structure of
choice even for larger, well-known firms.12 5 Like reverse mergers,
PIPE regulation evolved step-by-step rather than by design, so that a
multibillion-dollar marketplace came into being with no formal SEC
rulemaking deliberation about the optimal approach to that regula-
tion.'26 Notwithstanding its extraordinary practical importance, how-
ever, legal academics paid almost no attention to PIPE regulation
thority over it). For a discussion, see Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars?Janus Capi-
tal and Conservative Securities Jurisprudence, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
123 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 96. The new standards call for
a one-year "seasoning period" for nonexchange trading after the merger prior to listing.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
124 Joseph, supra note 82 ("[I]n 2007 there were 222 reverse mergers completed and
45% of them included a concurrent PIPE, raising approximately $1 billion."). Large com-
panies were the earliest users of this transactional form which then became popular with
smaller issuers.
125 SeeJeffrey Marell & Tracey Zaccone, PIPEs: RaisingEquity Capital in Uncertain Times,
HARv. L. ScH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 3, 2009, 10:58 PM), http://
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/06/03. The Berkshire Hathaway investment in both
General Electric and Goldman Sachs were PIPE transactions, as was KKR's in Sun Microsys-
tems. See DAVID P. STOWELL, INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQuriY 331
(2d ed. 2013). For useful data on the use of PIPE financing, see Susan Chaplinsky & David
Haushalter, Financing Under Extreme Risk: Contract Terms and Returns to Private Investments in
Public Equity, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2789, 2794-95, 2797-802 (2010).
126 From 1995 to 2010, some 17,000 PIPE deals raised approximately $460 billion; in
2007 alone there were 1,249 PIPE deals, which raised approximately $56 billion in capital.
See Na Dai, Monitoring via Staging: Evidence from Private Investments in Public Equity, 35 J.
BANKING & FIN. 3417, 3417 (2011); Na Dai, The Rise of the PIPE Market, in PRIVATE EqurrY
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until recently. In securities regulation casebooks and other analytic
discussions, the topic is often relegated to a short note, if mentioned
at all. PIPE regulation is perhaps the most important in a category of
hybrid financing techniques (such as rights offerings, directed selling
programs, and the like) that receive less attention than they should
outside a relatively small circle of legal specialists who understand
their strange "metaphysics."12 7
PIPE deals have many variations in how they can be structured. 28
Their common feature, however, is fairly straightforward: the issuer
does an exempt private placement with a small number of investors
who would thus ordinarily have to hold those securities for the dura-
tion of the Rule 144 holding period.129 But many issuers in PIPE
transactions have been smaller, financially challenged, and with ques-
tionable future prospects, so that even a six-month illiquidity risk is
substantial. The solution is a registration rights agreement: the issuer
agrees to file a registration statement with the SEC to permit the inves-
tors' resales into the public markets as soon as it is declared effec-
tive. 30 This procedure shortens the period of illiquidity for the
investors and thereby overcomes what might otherwise be an insuper-
able obstacle to their participation. The gain to the issuer is clear
enough: it gets its money (which is often badly needed) upon closing
the private placement sooner rather than later. The private place-
ment can also be done confidentially, avoiding the downward price
pressure associated with public disclosure.
The economics here are interesting. Traditionally registered eq-
uity offerings (whether IPOs or seasoned offerings) work well when,
through disclosure, information-asymmetry barriers can reasonably be
overcome, but they are less attractive when the company's operations
or prospects remain highly opaque even in the face of conventional
financial disclosure.' 31 PIPE financing is generally seen as a solution
to conditions of high informational asymmetry.'32 With the assistance
of a placement agent, PIPE investors-which can be hedge funds, ven-
ture capital providers, or other kinds of institutional investors-bring
knowledge and skill to bear in the private negotiation, leading to the
FUND TYPES, RISKS AND RETURNS, AND REGULATION 111, 111-12 (Douglas Cumming ed.,
2010).
127 See, e.g., Stanley Keller, Basic Securities Act Concepts Revisited, INSIGHTS, May 1995, at 5,
9.
128 See Sjostrom, PIPEs, supra note 21, at 383-85. For an extensive practical discussion
of how PIPE deals are done, see 1 ANNA T. PINEDO & JAMES R. TANENBAUM, EXEMPT AND
HYBRID SECURITIES OFFERINGS chs. 13-15 (2011).
129 See Sjostrom, PIPEs, supra note 21, at 382.
130 See id. at 383.
131 See Hsuan-Chi Chen et al., The Choice of Equity Selling Mechanisms: PIPEs Versus SEOs,




discount from the prevailing market price at which the investors are
willing to buy the securities. That discount is often sizable.' 33 To the
extent practicable, the investors then hedge their risk by short selling
the issuers' securities as soon as the PIPE deal is publicly announced.
Under the right conditions, the willingness of reputable investors to
take on the risk is a positive signal about the otherwise financially chal-
lenged issuer.
Because the first step (the private placement) is unregulated, this
is simply a matter of bargaining power, and the issuer may well be
disadvantaged by its need for cash and paucity of other options. The
terms can be harsh and severely dilutive of existing shareholders, but
that does not necessarily indicate anything wrong so long as manage-
ment is bargaining the best it can. The second step-the follow-on
registration-brings '33 Act registration into play. 134 All sorts of com-
plex problems have arisen: for instance, section 5 liability associated
with short selling by the investors135 or insider trading if the direction
of the price move upon public announcement is predictable.13 6
The regulatory question here of interest pertains to the charac-
terization of public resale that takes place upon the effectiveness of
the issuer's registration statement. For all practical purposes, the two
steps are part of a single plan of capital raising by the issuer so that the
issuer seems to be engaged in a public sale of securities through the
short-term parking of the securities in the hands of institutional in-
termediaries (underwriters). If so, the issuer and the PIPE investors
face substantial section 11 liability risks which in turn would impel the
133 The fact of a discount is not surprising. There are often discounts for seasoned
equity offerings if, for example, the market takes management's choice to pursue this form
of fundraising over other options as new information that management views the firm's
stock as overvalued. The issue is how large the discount will be. For a comparison of
discounts in the SEO and PIPE setting, see Na Dai & Hsuan-Chi Chen, Seasoned Equity
Selling Mechanisms: Costs and Innovations, J. PRIVATE EQurry, Summer 2008, at 16, 23 (esti-
mating average discount at 31.5% for PIPEs, more than eight times the SEO discount, plus
an agent fee of around 7%). Many PIPE issuers are heavily involved in research and use
funds to continue such efforts as the cash burn accelerates. SeeJames R. Brown & loannis
V. Floros, Access to Private Equity and Real Firm Activity: Evidence from PIPEs, 18 J. CoP. FIN.
151, 156-57, 163 (2012) (displaying data showing amount of investment in research and
design for PIPE issuers).
134 As a technical matter, the key legal step that makes the PIPE transaction work is the
determination that the first and second steps are not "integrated" into a single transaction.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (2013) (providing that integration is not automatic simply because
private placement is followed by registered offering). This question is one of the most
technically challenging of the "metaphysics" in this area, but it is not our particular focus
here.
135 See SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
136 See Sjostrom, PIPEs, supra note 21, at 410-12 (describing SEC enforcement actions
regarding insider trading). The best known of these enforcement actions involves the
sports entrepreneur Mark Cuban. See SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 2010).
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kind of due diligence typically associated with a registered offering,
limiting regulatory worry about such deals.
But the economics are such that PIPE buyers are unwilling to
take part in these deals if indeed exposed to such liability-the risk
(and related registration burdens) is simply too great. Thus, PIPE
regulation proceeds on the fiction that the institutions are just ordi-
nary selling shareholders whose public resales are being facilitated by
the registration rather than purchasers who bought from the issuer
with a view toward a distribution (clearly so) or assisted the issuer in a
distribution of its securities (ditto).137 As a result, registration is sim-
plified via shelf registration, taking advantage of incorporation by ref-
erence to the issuer's periodic filings and with less scrutiny of the
offering by the SEC. The issuer remains on the section 11 hook along
with insiders, directors, and auditors. However, since PIPE issuers are
often financially challenged, a bad offering will frequently be followed
by insolvency, making the issuer a poor litigation target, and the
others may not have particularly deep pockets either. The missing
underwriters could make a difference.
In the mid-2000s, after finding much not to like about certain
PIPE deals in terms of insider trading, short-selling concerns, and deal
structures that seemed toxic to the issuer and its existing sharehold-
ers, the SEC staff informally shifted course. In addition to some
high-profile enforcement actions, the staff signaled that the primary-
secondary distinction could not be taken for granted and that PIPE
deals whose size was greater than one-third of the issuer's already-out-
standing shares might be considered primary and thus not eligible for
the simplified selling-shareholder treatment.138 PIPE investors would
then risk being considered statutory underwriters. To this extent, the
window was partly closed. The reaction to the SEC's informal shift was
negative notjust in the business and legal community-which had by
that time developed a large appetite for PIPEs-but also in the aca-
demic literature. 139
For the reasons noted, underwriter status seems almost concep-
tually self-evident, whether or not the offering passes the one-third
threshold. PIPE investors are buying from the issuer with a view to-
137 See Sjostrom, PIPEs, supra note 21, at 410 (noting investors' regulatory arbitrage by
avoiding underwriter obligations).
138 See Stanley Keller & William Hicks, Unblocking Clogged PIPEs: SEC Focuses on Availabil-
ity ofRule 415, INSIGHTS, May 2007, at 2, 3-4; Anna T. Pinedo &James R. Tanenbaum, When
a Primary is Not a Pimary, INT'L FIN. L. REv., May 2007, at 26, 27. Factors examined in the
inquiry (largely with respect to greater-than-one-third transactions) could include the po-
tential "toxicity" of the PIPE arrangement, the quality of disclosure, and the likely speed
and aggressiveness of resale-suggesting that the SEC staff is simply making a subjective
assessment of the risk to investors.
139 See, e.g., Sjostrom, PIPEs, supra note 21, at 411-12 ("[T]he exact policy justification
for the reinterpretation remains unclear.").
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ward a distribution of the securities and assisting the issuer in a de
facto distribution.14 0 The staff had given away much of the "under-
writer" definition to these new practices until it partly pulled back. So
why the criticism?
The argument mainly is that financially challenged firms need the
speed and simplicity that PIPE deals afford-such firms are out of
other options. But that reference to capital formation in and of itself
cannot be a satisfactory argument unless it is simply allowed to trump
investor protection (which only now may seem plausible following the
JOBS Act). The argument tends to continue by emphasizing the deal
flexibility and the ability of sophisticated institutional investors to
solve the otherwise vexing issues associated with high informational
asymmetry. That we will take as so, but it is not particularly important
if all that the PIPE investors are doing is parking the securities for a
short while and being highly compensated for doing so.
The question that receives too little attention-but which is ulti-
mately crucial to the policy discussion-is how the public investors
who buy from PIPE investors fare. We know relatively little here ex-
cept for some evidence that the average long-term performance of
PIPE-issued securities appears to be negative (although that is true for
IPOs too).141 What is missing is any serious exploration of when and
how aggressively PIPE investors dispose of their shares after the effec-
tiveness of the registration. If shares are held even after the effective
date and only gradually dispersed into the public markets, we have
less cause for concern; if they are dumped promptly via heavy broker-
dealer marketing efforts, then we have more to worry about.
The evidence suggests substantial variation, both over time and
depending on the particular deal. Some PIPE investors are venture-
capital funds that, while gaining the right to resell, tend to hold and
engage in serious monitoring efforts while they remain invested. This
behavior is typically a positive signal to the market and not surpris-
ingly leads to a stock price increase upon announcement. The inves-
tors do their diligence, though perhaps not as much as when they are
more tightly locked in to the investment. By contrast, ordinary hedge
funds have no reputation for sticking around, and the stock price re-
140 In part, the acquiescence in non-underwriter treatment was an outgrowth of the
SEC staffs abandonment of the so-called "presumptive underwriter" doctrine, which had
treated large institutional investors in a public offering as underwriters. See 2 Louis Loss &
JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1114 n.577 (3d ed. 1989) (analyzing the presump-
tive underwriting doctrine). However, there are significant differences between that gen-
eral context and the situation where hedge funds and other financial institutions make
their financing available pursuant to an understanding that facilitates prompt resales.
141 See, e.g., Chen et al., supra note 131, at 105 ("Market-adjusted returns over longer
intervals ... [show] PIPEs displaying the weaker performance [as compared to SEOs].").
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action to their presence as PIPE investors seems to be negative.' 4 2
Other deals with more reputable intermediaries probably fall in
between.143
Were we able to trust the marketplace of public investors to read
these signals well, price adjustment might provide adequate protec-
tion. But these deals often take place in thinly traded markets where
efficiency properties are not especially strong and where skillful bro-
ker-dealer pumping practices can be particularly effective. Without
knowing more about the resale markets, we have to be tentative; how-
ever, it does not seem for now that the SEC staff was being particularly
unreasonable in its policymaking. Public investors lose a significant
component of certified due diligence in PIPE deals, even under cir-
cumstances where it could be helpful. The staffs one-third rule of
thumb is a way of saying that the more stock to be issued, the heavier
the resale marketing pressure may be and hence the greater the risk
associated with the loss of diligence. As we have been emphasizing
throughout this section, it all comes back to the likelihood of sales
pressure.
To be sure, critics can always play the capital-formation trump
card and argue that the value of PIPE financing as a transaction of last
resort for challenged issuers outweighs any increased risk to inves-
tors.14 4 Admittedly, there are other incentives toward candor even in
the absence of underwriter treatment. Ultimately, the question is an
empirical one about which not enough is known. But we remain
suspicious.
That is not to say, by any means, that PIPE financing should be
shut off; it certainly has provided a needed outlet for some issuers. As
with reverse mergers, there are some alternative regulatory possibili-
ties. One would be to tolerate treatment of PIPEs as secondary offer-
ings but restrict the use of shelf-registration procedures or otherwise
involve more SEC staff in the review process before effectiveness. At a
time of diminished resources, however, that may not be feasible. An-
other relatively mild possibility would be to insist that the PIPE inves-
tors and placement agent file a statement with the SEC as a condition
142 See David J. Brophy et al., Hedge Funds as Investors of Last Resort?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD.
541, 542-43, 563 (2009); Na Dai, Does Investor Identity Matter? An Empirical Examination of
Investments by Venture Capital Funds and Hedge Funds in PIPEs, 13 J. Cop. FIN. 538, 561-62
(2007).
143 The placement agents vary in reputation as well. See Na Dai et al., The Quality and
Price of Investment Banks' Service: Evidence from the PIPE Market, 39 FIN. MGM1T. 585, 594
(2010).
144 See, e.g., Tougher SEC Standards Are Clogging the PIPE-Line, TURNAROUND MGMT. Ass'N
(May 1, 2007), http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?Objectld=7554&
Mode= ("While PIPE offerings by distressed companies can be highly costly and risky to
public shareholders, they may also represent the company's last best chance to correct its
financial course before bankruptcy .. . .").
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for secondary offering treatment describing what, if any, due dili-
gence efforts were undertaken and representing that they are not
aware of any false or misleading material misstatements or omissions
in the issuer's registration statement. This could be coupled with a
more forthcoming description of any plans or arrangements for the
distribution of the securities after effectiveness. We would at least
know more at relatively little marginal cost.
III
THE JOBS AcT INNOVATIONS
The JOBS Act resets the public-private boundary for the '33 Act
by expanding issuers' ability to use small offering exemptions or make
private placements to accredited investors without having to satisfy the
demands of a registered public offering.' 45 Of the three major JOBS
Act efforts to enhance '33 Act capital raising without the burdens of
registration-"crowdfunding," the new "Reg A+" exemption, and the
removal of the ban on general solicitation for private placements to
accredited investors under Rule 506-we think that the last of these
will be where the JOBS Act has its most substantial impact, raising
issues similar to those explored in Part II but with far greater intensity.
A. Crowdfunding and "Reg A+"
The JOBS Act crowdfunding exemption found in the new section
4(a) (6) is difficult to evaluate because the final version that emerged
from the political process is conceptually incoherent. Its original
backers had wanted a nearly regulation-free zone wherein start-ups
and other early stage issuers could at little cost use the Internet, either
directly or through funding portals, to display their business plan and
seek out small investors who share their entrepreneurial dream, how-
ever risky it might be.146 With relatively minor exceptions, the main
investor protection would have come through wealth- and income-
based limits on how much any single investor could invest (and thus
lose) in any one venture as well as a one million dollar cap on how
much the issuer could raise in any transaction. In contrast to the cur-
rent Rule 504 in Reg D, which has a similar dollar cap for issuers and
no mandatory disclosure requirements, 147 advertising and other solici-
145 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Approves JOBS Act Requirement to
Lift General Solicitation Ban (July 10, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/
Detail/PressRelease/ 1370539707782#.UgDu8FvD-po; Vincent Ryan, Advertise, but Venfy,
CFO.com (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www3.cfo.com/article/2012/1 1/capital-markets-private-
placement-general-solicitation-rule-506offerings-jobs-act.
146 For a good discussion of the background and legislative history, see C. Steven Brad-
ford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REc. L.J. 195,
199-201 (2012).
147 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2013).
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tations would be permitted, and, crucially, state blue-sky registration
of the offering would be preempted-a characteristic that Rule 504
offerings lack. Enthusiasts for crowdfunding stressed that Internet of-
ferings would harness the "wisdom of the crowds" to separate the
good business plans from the deficient (or corrupt). 4 8 A bill reflect-
ing this deregulatory vision passed the House by a wide margin.14 9
This was the most heavily criticized portion of the multiple bills
that were folded into the JOBS legislation; investor advocates noted
the substantial freedom of "portal" entrepreneurs to emerge in boiler-
room fashion to promote risky stock without any registration or disclo-
sure obligations and pointed out many instances when crowds have
been duped.o50 This is where key members of the Senate balked. A
last-minute compromise emerged that substantially revised the
crowdfunding definitions and conditions. But in the process, the
compromise turned a regulation-free zone into a quite heavy and
costly set of responsibilities on both issuers and any intermediaries
that assist them' 5 1-so much so that it is difficult for us to see why a
rational start-up entrepreneur would find it appealing to use the new
4(a) (6) exemption at all. Our prediction is that unless the SEC turns
its back on serious rulemaking and enforcement in this area, this will
not turn out to be particularly fertile ground for start-up capital-rais-
ing activity; the regulatory costs are likely to take too much of the
148 See Kanyi Maqubela, The Power and the Peril of Our Crowdfunded Future, ATLANTIC (July
2, 2012, 11:47 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/07/the-power-
and-the-peril-of-our-crowdfunded-future/259304/. This is not a necessary assumption, of
course. Other proponents of the exemption rested their case on the simple belief that if
people wanted to risk a limited amount of their money on a dream, the government
should not stop them, especially if the money might spark a greater level of
entrepreneurship.
149 See Maria Lokshin, House Approves Bills to Exempt Crowdfunding, Lift General Solicita-
tion Ban, 43 SEc. REc. & L. REP. (BNA) 2246 (Nov. 7, 2011) (reporting a vote of 407 to 17).
150 See, e.g., Spurring job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of
John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor, Columbia University Law School), available at http://www.
law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&fileid=62588 ("Failure
to adopt this approach (or some similar variant) would likely mean that every barroom in
America could become a securities market, as some unregistered salesman, vaguely resem-
bling Danny DeVito, could set up shop to market securities under the 'crowdfunding ex-
emption.'"). Key SEC officials, including Chairman Mary Schapiro, also spoke publicly
about their concerns with the House's crowdfunding exemption. SeeYin Wilczek, Schapiro
Faults JOBS Bill for Gaps in Investor Protection, Short Deadlines, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
560 (Mar. 19, 2012).
151 See Maria Lokshin, Senate Passes Amended JOBS Act, Cantor to Schedule House Vote
Soon, 44 SEC. REc. & L. REP. (BNA) 597 (Mar. 26, 2012). The Senate amendments in-




small amount of money that can be raised even if portals absorb some
of the anticipated costs. 1 5 2
Others have explored crowdfunding both pre- and post-JOBS
Act from a variety of perspectives, 15 3 and we do not need to repeat
their analysis. We think that there might be a good case for allowing
some level of crowdfunding, at least through a (presumably small)
number of registered portals that have satisfied the SEC that they have
robust plans for dealing with the rather obvious and inevitable temp-
tations for abuse, including fraud, manipulation, exploitation of inves-
tor ignorance, violations of issuer and investor caps, and the like.154
But this is far from either the initial or final versions of section 4(a) (6)
and so we limit our comments to a few points that connect to our
broader interests. First, regarding the so-called wisdom of crowds155 :
There are actually two ideas at work here, somewhat in tension. One
is that exposing an entrepreneur's idea to an open forum allows for
communication among interested parties, allowing the crowd's collec-
tive reaction to elicit new information-someone with knowledge, for
example, sharing that an otherwise exciting vision risks a patent viola-
tion.156 Yet nothing in the legislation insists on any such openness.157
That is actually a harder issue than it seems because the
wisdom-of-crowds literature stresses that open communication may
also have a downside, introducing the risk of anchoring crowd-
152 SeeYin Wilczek, SEC, Crowdfunding Participants Headed for Culture Clash Under Pending
Regime, 44 SEC. REC. & L. REP. (BNA) 1524 (Aug. 13, 2012).
153 For post-JOBS Act perspectives, see, for example, Bradford, supra note 146. See
generally Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execu-
tion, 64 FLA. L. REv. 1433 (2012) (discussing the substantial regulatory costs of the
crowdfunding exemption); Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Net-
works and the Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on
Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1735 (2012) (discussing the need for meaningful
disclosures to protect investors). For pre-JOBS Act perspectives, see, for example, C.
Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. I
[hereinafter Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws] (discussing expensive
registration requirements and the danger that the SEC may consider websites that facilitate
crowdsourcing brokers or investment advisors and advocating for a crowdsourcing exemp-
tion); Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfund-
ing and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REv. 879 (2011) (advocating for a
crowdsourcing exemption).
154 The key would seem to be the emergence of portals with the incentive to self-
police, doing some of the due diligence necessary to prevent fraud. This is likely to come,
at least initially, by channeling crowdfunding opportunities to portals with large enough
volume and order flow to justify the commitment and survive for the long run.
155 For an in-depth discussion of the wisdom of crowds, see generally JAMES
SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND
How COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINEsS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS (2004).
156 See id. at 10 (describing each person's access to private information as a characteris-
tic of wise crowds).
157 See generally Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 153, at
6-23 (discussing the crowdsourcing exemption's requirements).
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members' beliefs and undermining the averaging effect of many inde-
pendent beliefs.158 Suffice it to say that the final compromise version
of section 4(a) (6) has none of the mechanisms built in that might
make equity crowdfunding resemble the kinds of markets that have
emerged in other contexts.159 Indeed, the final compromise version
makes the exemption available to an issuer that uses either a funding
portal or a broker-dealer firm to raise the capital. 160 The latter obvi-
ously raises a serious sales pressure concern-a marginal issuer can
find a marginal broker to do cold-call telephone solicitations and in-
voke the exemption from mandatory disclosure and state regulation.
Obviously, this is far distant from the vision said to justify crowdfund-
ing; those cold calls (or e-mail spam) will be exposed to neither a
crowd nor much likelihood of any wisdom.161
Finally, note that the JOBS Act contains an interesting reversal of
Gustafson for cases of crowdfunding fraud or misrepresentation. Lia-
bility for material misstatements or omissions in crowdfunding tracks
the negligence-based standard of section 12(a) (2), as Congress chose
to make it "as if the liability were created under section 12(a) (2)."162
Liability is shared not just by the issuer but also by directors, partners,
and principal executive and financial officers, an extension of liability
that can be expected to increase the level of due diligence in these
158 See Richard P. Larrick et al., The Social Psychology of the Wisdom of Crowds, in SOCIAL
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 227, 232-33 (Joachim I. Krueger ed., 2012).
159 Most notably, there is no way to bet profitably against the entrepreneur. Even in
highly organized trading markets, short selling appears to be necessary to keep buy-side
optimism in check. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits ofArbitrage, 52J. FIN.
35, 49 (1997) ("Casual empiricism suggests that a great deal of professional arbitrage activ-
ity ... is concentrated in . . . markets where extreme leverage, short selling, and perform-
ance-based fees are common."). For a discussion of prediction markets which seek to
harness crowd wisdom, see generally MICHAEL ABRAMOWlcz, PREDICTOCRACY" MARKET
MECHANISMS FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING (2007).
160 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a), 126 Stat. 306,
315 (2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 77d(6) (C)) (adding § 4(6) (C) to the Securities Act
of 1933).
161 The requirement in the final version of the legislation that a funding portal or
broker be used was obviously designed to prevent issuer "Internet-direct" solicitations,
where start-ups use their own visibility to attract investors. Whether such offerings are
likely to succeed as a practical matter has been debated for some time. See, e.g., Jill E.
Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 57, 75-77 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of
"Technological Disintermediation "for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 1, 7-12 (1998); Sjostrom, Internet Direct Offerings, supra note 21, at 581-85. That
aside, there may be some justification for permitting outreach efforts by issuers who display
information on their own websites and (perhaps) communicate as to their interest in capi-
tal. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
SMALLER PUBLC COMPANIES TO THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 75-77
(2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf.
162 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(b) (adding section 4A(c) (1) (B) to the
Securities Act of 1933).
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offerings.163 In this sense, Congress was acting well within the familiar
template of securities regulation strategies in response to the sales
pressure concerns.
The JOBS Act also directs the SEC to promulgate a new set of
rules under section 3(b) for offerings up to fifty million dollars, build-
ing on the current "mini-registration" process under Reg A (thus the
nickname "Reg A+" for the yet-to-be-promulgated regulation). Disclo-
sure must include audited financial statements and such other disclo-
sures as the SEC may determine necessary in the public interest.16 4
The precise terms must await SEC rulemaking, but the contours that
Congress has directed in the statute suggest the type of scaled regula-
tion that currently exists for Reg A.16 5 It would be surprising if the
SEC requires less disclosure for this new offering than it already re-
quires for the existing section 3(b) offering, which covers offerings
only one tenth of the size permitted by the new exemption. As for
liability, Congress specified that section 12(a) (2) will apply to any per-
son offering or selling securities in this new format.166 So here again,
we have substantial investor protections of the sort well within our
template. Precisely for this reason, however, we wonder how attractive
this new exemption will be to entrepreneurs given that layering of
protections, although the expansion of the cap to fifty million dollars
offers broader potential for a favorable cost-benefit balance as issuers
are able to spread costs over a larger amount. This will depend in part
on whether there are more appealing capital-raising routes availa-
ble, 167 and we now turn to a venue that may well indeed be more
attractive.
163 Id. (adding § 4A(c) (3) to the Securities Act of 1933 and defining "issuer" to in-
clude the other named parties).
164 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 401 (striking section 3(b) of the Securities
Act of 1933 and replacing it with a new section 3(b)).
165 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2013).
166 SeeJumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 401 (adding § 3(b) (2) (D) to the Securi-
ties Act of 1933).
167 Reg A's history is instructive. It nearly disappeared after Reg D came into effect
because the freedom under the latter dominated Reg A's many exacting requirements. It
reemerged from dormancy when the SEC loosened its marketing restrictions to allow for
"testing the waters" through advertising and other sales effort without making any compa-
rable change to the general solicitation ban in Reg D. Cf Cox ET AL., supra note 66, at
319-23 (noting a positive response to Reg A's "testing the waters" initiative and indicating
that if the testing-the-waters activity was done in such a way that the activity could constitute
general solicitation, the issuer should wait six months before proceeding with a Reg D
offering in order to avoid integration problems that would raise general solicitation con-
cerns (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small
Business'Search for "A Moderate Capital", 31 DEL.J. CoRP. L. 77, 82-83 (2006) (describing the
non-use of Reg A). But the latter is just what the JOBS Act has also changed, as we are
about to see.
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B. Rule 506 and General Solicitations
1. The Original Assumption
Private placements have been a part of the '33 Act landscape
from the statute's enactment, a private space where issuers can make
offerings free of the publicness obligations of a registered public offer-
ing. James Landis, a principal drafter of the '33 Act and the SEC's
second chairman, explained the original section 4(2) exemption by
reference to "[t]he sale of an issue of securities to insurance compa-
nies or to a limited group of experienced investors." 168 An early re-
lease by the SEC's general counsel identified four core characteristics
that necessarily limited the use of the exemption. What was private
was defined by characteristics that negated publicness-there could
only be a small number of offerees and they had to be linked to the
issuer by access or relationship, requirements that would practically
preclude an offering to a large number of investors.169 A ban on gen-
eral solicitation of offerees, our focus in terms of the JOBS Act
change, was thus implicit in the approach to private placements from
the beginning. Offers made to the public could not fit within an ex-
emption specifically defined as nonpublic.
As we have seen, the Supreme Court's first and only explication
of this exemption in Ralston Purina, two decades into the '33 Act's life,
linked the defining characteristics to the policy of those who could
fend for themselves, for whom the protections of the '33 Act were not
necessary. Appellate court interpretations through the next two and a
half decades suggested a narrow reading of such a group-even seem-
ingly narrowed further at times to include only insiders or those with a
similar close relationship to the issuer, or to take in those who had
sophistication or access to information that would provide them with
the means to protect themselves. 170 Again, this narrow conception of
the exemption effectively ruled out aggressive marketing to a broad
audience of potential investors, even fairly sophisticated ones.
This early reading of the section 4(2) exemption meant that such
deals were negotiated and not (simply) sold.1 71 And that was consis-
168 James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 29, 37 (1959).
169 See Securities Act Release No. 285, 1935 WL 27785 (Jan. 24, 1935).
170 Cf Cox ET AL. supra note 66, at 271-80 (discussing SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S.
119 (1953) and other Fifth Circuit decisions discussing this exemption).
171 See, e.g., Manuel F. Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of Securities,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 119, 142 n.64 (1959) ("Private placements had their beginnings and
early development in the negotiated sale of specially tailored debt securities to a limited
number of large institutional investors who were in a position to insist upon and receive
more information than that provided by registration and to require such protective cove-
nants or restrictions which, together with their ability to supervise constantly and to take
appropriate action instantly, supported the view that such offerings were non-public in
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tent with the theme we have been stressing throughout this Article.
When a concentrated group of sophisticated purchasers negotiates
with the issuer, the purchasers are in a position to bargain for infor-
mation and its credibility through representations and warranties. In
this sense, they can choose the level of due diligence expected of the
issuer and other offering participants. Contract law remedies are am-
ple in the event of a breach, supplemented by tort law with respect to
misrepresentations that induce the transaction in the first place. In
this original understanding of the private-placement exemption, what
later became the holding in Gustafson would make sense.172 There is
no real need for a federal liability supplement such as that found in
section 12(a) (2) where bargaining among a limited number of sophis-
ticated parties will create its own set of protections. And it is not par-
ticularly surprising that this distinction between offerings that are
negotiated with a small group and those that are sold to dispersed
investors became significant in other contexts as well, such as deter-
mining whether what is being distributed is a security in the first
place.173
2. The Transition to Reg D
The early conception of what constituted an exempt private offer-
ing was frustrating and distasteful to entrepreneurs and securities
firms who wanted to be more aggressive in finding sources of capital
without filing a registration statement or doing a mini-registration Reg
A offering. In response to this pressure, SEC rulemaking provided a
safe harbor that effectively widened the exemption in the 1970s and
early 1980s. The first experiment, Rule 146, was promulgated in 1974
and based suitability not just on sophistication but alternatively on the
ability to bear economic risk.' 74 But that was still seen as too subjec-
tive a standard for promoters who wanted to be sure that their sales
efforts would not violate the '33 Act's registration requirement. 175
The regulatory alchemy finally came with the adoption of Reg D in
1982, shortly after Congress had nudged the SEC toward liberalization
by adopting a JOBS Act predecessor, the Small Business Investment
character for which the protections of the registration provisions were probably
unnecessary.").
172 See Peter V. Letsou, The Scope of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 95, 128-33 (1996).
173 See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 68 (1990) (stating that a widespread
"plan of distribution" indicates that a note is a security); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S.
551, 559-60 (1982) (stating that an individual negotiation points against security status).
174 See Securities Act Release No. 5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261, 15,261-62 (May 2, 1974).
175 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of
1933: Practical Foreclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1139, 1143-47.
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Incentive Act of 1980.176 The SEC's dramatic step came through a
definition of "accredited investors" that created a class of persons
whose wealth alone would satisfy this standard. The term included not
only banks and institutional investors but also individual investors with
what were then distinctly upper-class incomes (two hundred thousand
dollars per year) or net worth (one million dollars).177
Capital-raising transactions under Rule 506, if directed solely at
accredited investors, did not mandate disclosure, did not require so-
phistication or an offeree representative, and could be directed at an
unlimited number of potential purchasers, all without any upper dol-
lar limit.1 78 Not only did this shift to wealth as a metric lessen the
likely sophistication that purchasers would bring to the transac-
tions,179 but it also made salesmanship an attractive possibility. There
could be marketing of deals to many widely scattered investors rather
than negotiations with empowered principals or bargaining agents.
In that light, contract tools become less reliable, and the usual securi-
ties-law principles encouraging due diligence become more valua-
ble-in other words, we came closer to the set of concerns about sales
pressure that we believe motivated the '33 Act in the first place.
This policy shift-nearly invisible in the text of the safe harbors
themselves-was momentous and ideologically charged, very much
the product of the Reagan-era deregulatory impulse that took hold in
176 Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). Congress created an accredited-investor exemption in the past but without refer-
ence to an individual's wealth as a standard. The SEC had experimented with a
wealth-based exemption in its short-lived Rule 242, but it only exempted large block pur-
chasers as accredited investors. See Susan E. Satkowski, Note, Rule 242 and Section 4(6) Secur-
ities Registration Exemptions: Recent Attempts to Aid Small Businesses, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 73,
81-82 (1981).
177 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (2012) (defining "accredited investor").
178 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad)
Outcomes for the SEC's Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 Bus. LAw. 919, 933 (2011). The exemption
could also be used for nonaccredited investors if there are less than thirty-five and if their
representative satisfied a sophistication standard. See id. at 921, 925. The inclusion of
nonaccredited investors initially required that all investors (accredited or nonaccredited)
receive disclosures, but that requirement has since been cut back to just nonaccredited
investors. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(ii) (1983) (requiring disclosures to both ac-
credited and nonaccredited investors if nonaccredited investors were purchasers), with 17
C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (1) (2012) (requiring disclosures only to nonaccredited investors if
nonaccredited investors are purchasers). In any case, it was the accredited market that
drove the growth in the use of the rule. See Campbell, supra, at 929 (reporting that in 2010
there were no nonaccredited investors in 91.2% of Rule 506 offerings).
179 See Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in
Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKA. L. REv. 291, 299-301 (1994); Manning Gilbert
Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings Under
the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 355, 382 (1984) ("Experience indicates that the
wealthy often do not have the sophistication to demand access to material information or
otherwise to evaluate the merits and risks of a prospective investment.").
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the early 1980s.180 In essence, the treatment of accredited investors in
Reg D was premised on the idea that such persons would (or at least
should be expected to) fend for themselves without any more help
from regulation than a prohibition against fraud and other ancillary
protections found in other statutes. '33 Act registration was thus im-
plicitly cast as an exercise in paternalism, unnecessary and potentially
disruptive when contractual freedom would suffice. We will pick back
up on this thread when we get to the JOBS Act's changes to Rule 506.
However, there were limitations that blunted the impact of this
shift at the time of its adoption and hence muted the political contro-
versy. The first such limitation was the dollar figure in the definition
of accredited investor: in 1981, an income of two hundred thousand
dollars or millionaire status in terms of net worth covered a relatively
limited number of very well-off people and did not affect all that many
retail investors.18' Second, Rule 506 offerings were restricted as to
resale for a fairly lengthy period, meaning that those inclined to trade
their securities would not much be interested in these kinds of trans-
actions even if qualified.182 Third, there was the possibility that state
blue-sky regulation would still apply to regulate the private place-
ment.183 Fourth, there was the potential of section 12(a) (2) liabil-
ity.'8 4 Fifth, there was the ban on general solicitations. 185
The ban on general solicitations seems to be implicit in the sec-
tion 4(2) exemption that the SEC purported to be interpreting via the
Rule 506 safe harbor.186 Thus, no widespread advertising or market-
ing was permissible even if targeted only at accredited investors.187 As
construed by the SEC staff in a series of no-action letters, the market-
ing of Rule 506 offerings required a distinct two-step process wherein
a potential investor would first be "qualified" as an accredited investor
180 See generally Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the
Dynamics ofRegulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 227 (1990) (discussing the evolution of
Regulation D throughout the 1980s).
181 In 1981, there were 138,136 individual income tax returns reporting an adjusted
gross income of two hundred thousand dollars or more. See infra note 201. According to
the earliest available census data on household net worth, only the top 3.5% of U.S. house-
holds had a net worth of over half a million dollars in 1991. Asset Ownership of Households:
1993, U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, http://www.census.gov/people/wealth/files/wlth93-4a.pdf
(last visited Aug. 1, 2013).
182 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2013).
183 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of NSMJA on Small Issuers, 53 Bus. IAw.
575, 579-81 (1998) (describing the obstacles imposed by state regulations on the small
business's access to capital market).
184 See supra text accompanying note 166.
185 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c).
186 SeeSecurities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,257-58 (Mar. 16, 1982)
(noting that Rule 506 relates to exempt transactions under section 4(2) of the Securities
Act and that the ban on general solicitation follows Rule 146(c) which is replaced by Rule
506).
187 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c).
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and only thereafter be approached with the specific investment
pitch.""8 Effectively-and maybe deliberately-this forced issuers rais-
ing capital through a Rule 506 offering to use the (expensive) services
of a registered broker-dealer firm which would have the preexisting
relationships with investors needed to facilitate this two-step process.
That turned out to be extremely frustrating to small-business capital
raisers who began a lengthy-and for a long time unsuccessful-cam-
paign to eliminate the ban.189
In the meantime, however, much changed with respect to Reg D.
As we have already seen, amendments to Rule 144 over the last fifteen
years quietly, but dramatically, reduced the resale constraints, increas-
ing the roster of those who might be interested in acquiring securities
pursuant to a Reg D offering.o90 From the earliest days of federal se-
curities regulation, the '33 Act worked to limit resales in ways that
reduced the need to think about resales of securities of companies
that did not report under the '34 Act. 191 Any resale of the securities
before they had come to rest would destroy the exemption of the orig-
inal offering and leave the reseller exposed. The exact time period
was unclear, but the most frequent rule of thumb was three years. 192
The practical result was that investors would not purchase the shares
with an expectation of quick resales, dampening any development of a
trading market. At the other end, the relatively shorter period of time
before a company's IPO created the potential for a shorter gap be-
tween the expiration of trading restrictions and the availability of pub-
licness obligations under the '34 Act.
When originally promulgated in 1972, the holding period for us-
ing the safe harbor of Rule 144 was three years for shares of compa-
nies that were not reporting companies,193 the shares that are our
focus here. As we have already noted in connection with reverse
188 For a review of the guidance, see COX ET AL., supra note 66, at 291-300.
189 For a discussion of and citations to these efforts, see generally Stuart R. Cohn, The
Impact of Securities Laws on Developing Companies: Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten Off the
Ground?, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 315 (1999).
190 See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text (summarizing circumstances under
which securities can be resold under Rule 144).
191 The language of section 5's registration requirement is global in its reach and in-
cludes resales but section 4(a)(1)'s exemption for transactions other than by an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer effectively protects resales unless they are swept into a distribution
involving interstate commerce. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(1), 77e (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also
15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (defining "underwriter" in terms ofa connection to the distribution of
securities).
192 See COX ET AL., supra note 66, at 345-48 ("At one time, most practitioners believed
investment intent is established if the shares have been held for three years.").
193 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. For shares of reporting companies, the
holding period was two years. See id. An initial purchaser of restricted stock could also
resell pursuant to a privately negotiated "4(11/2)" exemption or other transaction that
would not destroy the original exemption, but such a route is not likely to lead to the
intensive selling efforts that would trigger our concern here. See Cox ET AL., supra note 66,
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mergers, in 1997 the SEC reduced the holding period to two years,
and in 2007 it further shortened it to one year. 194 Of course, the legal
ability to trade doesn't make much difference if there is no market for
the shares. But the growth in platforms such as SecondMarket and
SharesPost expanded trading outlets for shares not listed in stock ex-
changes or that otherwise have not become public companies under
the '34 Act.195 The result is that it seems more economically feasible
for investors to think about a business plan for acquiring shares in a
private placement to hold for a year and then resell, particularly as
technology makes it easier to access platforms that facilitate secondary
trading. Indeed, we would not be surprised to find brokers willing to
facilitate large-scale resales by acquiring restricted securities at the
end of the holding period by means of a tender offer which would
enable them to turn around and do an intense marketing of a large
block of stock, all free of any '33 Act restrictions.' 9 6
Then there was the Gustafson case in 1995.197 Although nothing
in Reg D addresses liability, a general assumption at the time was that
section 12(a) (2)'s due diligence-forcing negligence standard would
apply to offers and sales of securities in exempt transactions.1 98 When
the Supreme Court squarely held that it did not apply outside the
context of a public offering, another restraint on aggressiveness in the
sales and marketing of unregistered securities disappeared.199 Shortly
thereafter came Congressional preemption of state blue-sky registra-
tion requirements for private placements exempt under Rule 506.
This was a less noticed part of a broader legislative effort to eliminate
state-law registration burdens for stock exchange-traded
companies. 200
at 385 ("Broad solicitations and advertising are generally believed to be inconsistent with
the Section 4(11/2) exemption.").
194 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
195 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 13, at 349.
196 This would depend, of course, on the acquirer not being a control person and thus
not being an affiliate of the issuer. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (2013) (providing for limita-
tion on amount of securities sold for the account of an affiliate).
197 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
198 See Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARv. L. REv. 908,
914-17 (1992) (discussing why section 12(2) liability should not be limited to registered
primary offerings).
199 FINRA rules do require due diligence when a broker-dealer is involved in a private
placement. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 10-22, REGULATION D OFFERINGs 6 (2010),
available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Notices/2010/P121299. But this is
not monitored on a real-time basis; brokers can be sanctioned if, after the fact, the enforce-
ment staff uncovers some lack of compliance, and such cases are relatively rare especially
in light of the vast volumes of such transactions.
200 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 102, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(b) (4) (D) (2006); Campbell, supra note 183, at 582-83. Prior to the legislation, there
had been frustrating efforts to develop uniformity in a state-level small-offering exemption.
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The final pre-JOBS Act change came simply through the passage
of time. When adopted, the definition of "accredited investor" con-
tained no provision for adjustment for inflation, and so over the ensu-
ing decades-particularly quickly in the inflationary environment of
the early part of that period-the wealth tests brought more and more
retail investors into accredited investor status.201 By the mid-2000s,
such status would attach to many upper-middle-class professionals.
And because retirement savings count toward net worth, the increas-
ing reliance on IRAs, 401(k) accounts, and other tax-advantaged sav-
ings programs pushed many current and future retirees into that
status as well, even if their incomes never came close to two hundred
thousand dollars a year and they were depending on that wealth to see
them through the rest of their lives.
As a result of these changes in the thirty years since Reg D came
into effect, the ban on general solicitations was carrying far more
weight than intended in its original design.
3. The JOBS Act Elimination of the Ban
The JOBS Act required the SEC to eliminate the prohibition
against general solicitation or general advertisements in Rule 506 of-
ferings if the offering is made only to accredited investors. 202 The
long-fought-now finally successful-campaign to eliminate the ban
on general solicitations as applied to offerings directed at accredited
investors had a great deal of academic as well as political support for a
simple reason: viewed narrowly, it made no sense. If one takes the
position that accredited investors can or should fend for themselves-
which is the foundational assumption in Rule 506-why was it reason-
able to prohibit issuers and their placement agents from actively seek-
ing them out? That some nonaccredited investors might be sucked
into the deal (perhaps misrepresenting their qualified status) as a re-
sult of the publicity seems to be overly solicitous, especially given the
separate requirement reiterated in the post-JOBS Act amendments to
Rule 506 that sellers take reasonable steps to assure accredited-only
201 JUSTIN BRYAN, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN: SPRING
2012, HIGH-INCOME TAx RETURNS FOR 2009, at 8 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/12insprbulhignincome.pdf (reporting that $200,000 in 1981 dollars would be
$319,508 in 2009 and that individual income tax returns at or above $200,000 made up
0.145% of filed returns in 1981 versus 2.793% of returns in 2009). Thus the $200,000 level
corresponds to a percentage of individual income tax returns that is about twenty times
higher than it was when the number was put into Reg D in 1981.
202 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306,
313-15 (2012) (amending 15 U.S.C. 77d). See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General
Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 9415 (July 10, 2013) 78 FR 44771 (July 24, 2013).
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distributions.2 03 That the ban on general solicitation was implicit in
Ralston Purina and its progeny might be right historically but so was a
bona fide sophistication or access requirement, both of which were
effectively ignored. Once policymakers were willing to radically reori-
ent the latter in the name of small-business capital raising by substitut-
ing wealth for sophistication and access to information as the standard
for qualification, there was no reason to be overly fastidious about the
former simply to respect precedent. So why keep the ban in place if it
was dampening capital formation?204
We agree there is no good answer when the question is posed this
way, which raised the possibility that the main function played by the
ban was just to enrich the broker-dealer industry-a pure public-
choice story. Our point here, however, is a broader one. As noted,
Reg D's controversial choice to shift to a wealth-based standard was
muted by five features that were present then but now have either
diminished in potency or disappeared entirely. 205 Accredited-investor
status is no longer for the very well off by virtue of inflation over time
and now encompasses a broad swath of retail investors in the United
States-indeed, most serious proposals to eliminate the ban on gen-
eral solicitations were coupled with proposals to adjust the qualifica-
tion standard upward fairly significantly. 2 0 6 The resale holding period
has been shortened by two-thirds. Gustafson has taken away negli-
gence-based liability for misrepresentations or actionable omissions in
resales and private placements. State regulation is preempted. And
now the ban has gone away too.
In other words, the sequence of changes culminating in the JOBS
Act has given us Rule 506 as applied to sales to accredited investors in
a much more pure, unadulterated-and thus more potent-form.
That the elimination of the ban on general solicitation preserves con-
203 See Securities Act Release No. 9415 (adding Rule 506(c) which, among other
things, requires issuers to take reasonable steps to verify that a purchaser in a Rule 506
offering with general solicitation is an accredited investor and provides nonexclusive safe
harbors methods of verification so long as the issuer does not know that such person is not
accredited).
204 See Cohn, supra note 189, at 359-60 (analyzing the adverse impact of restriction on
solicitation on small companies' offerings); see also Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley,
Capital Offense: The SEC's Continuing Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 1, 1 (2007) (examining the principal hurdles facing small businesses
seeking to raise capital and offering reform recommendations).
205 See supra text accompanying notes 181-85; see alsoJenniferJ. Johnson, Private Place-
ments: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 151, 176-79 (2010) (questioning the
continued value of the federal preemption of state regulation of private placements).
206 See FINAL REPORT OF THE SEC ADVisoRY COMMITTEE, supra note 161, at 77 (propos-
ing that two million dollars of net worth or three hundred thousand dollars of annual
income be required qualifications to be considered a natural person accredited investor).
The Advisory Committee called for a new exemption allowing certain kinds of general
solicitations but with an increase in the wealth test for determining qualified investors. See
id. at 74-81.
1616 [Vol. 98:1573
2013] REDRAWING THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE BOUNDARIES
sistency with the underlying assumption of Reg D is less compelling
when we remember that Reg D was never really debated in pure form
when the assumption was made.
Revisiting that question thoroughly would take us beyond the
scope of our current project and into the foundational debate in cor-
porate securities law about contractual freedom and legal interven-
tion. The point we want to stress, once more, is that as distributions of
securities move from bargaining with a small group of buyers to mass
marketing directed at a large, dispersed group of well-off retail inves-
tors, the likelihood of successful opportunism grows. In theory, of
course, the presence of a critical mass of sophisticated buyers will re-
duce the likelihood of opportunism even if we assume some unsophis-
ticated buyers. 207 Successful marketing makes it necessary to go
beyond them and appeal to the rational buyers. But that protection
works only if products cannot be differentiated so that some are mar-
keted to those who truly can fend for themselves while others are sold
to the vulnerable. 208 And if the vulnerable market is large enough,
there are incentives to find and sell hidden risk in the name of seduc-
tive returns through financial products targeting that segment of the
investor marketplace. 209
Ultimately, the question of whether large numbers of accredited
investors are vulnerable through the steroidal form of Rule 506 that
the JOBS Act creates is an empirical one. Data is lacking on the per-
formance of Reg D offerings that would permit a confident assess-
ment. The anecdotal evidence of abuses is considerable-for
example, nearly eight billion dollars of Prudential Securities' tax-shel-
tered limited partnership interests went bust, leading to large settle-
ments with regulators and investors in the early 1990s. 2 10 More
recently, failures to appreciate risk by even institutional buyers of
securitization and derivative products strongly suggest that the ability
of investors to fend for themselves is fictional if the investment is com-
plicated enough. FINRA had been warning about Reg D abuses for a
207 See Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD.
131, 151 (2008) (concluding that the likelihood that markets will generate normatively
desirable contract terms increases in part in the number of sophisticated consumers).
208 See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON.
PERSP. 161, 180 (2004) (suggesting a rule change that "harness[es] the monitoring efforts
of institutional investors for the benefit of unsophisticated investors" in investment vehicles
that include both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors). For a lengthier discussion
of the implications of this for retail investor protection, see Donald C. Langevoort, The
SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REv. 1025,
1042-58 (2009).
209 For an example at the extreme end of such behavior, see Laura Frieder &Jonathan
Zittrain, Spam Works: Evidence from Stock Touts and Corresponding Market Activity, 30 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 479, 506 (2008) (concluding that spamming works in stock markets
from the analysis of touting e-mail messages' impact on trading activity and returns).
210 The story is well told in KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENT ON THE ROCK (2005).
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number of years211 before the ban on general solicitation was re-
pealed. New SEC proposals, made the same day it promulgated the
final general solicitation rules, would insist on warning legends in
soliciting material and provide more information to the Commission
about the particular offering in order to enhance regulatory monitor-
ing,2 1 2 but the opportunity for more intense sales efforts would
remain.
Well-off senior citizens are a particularly troubling target of op-
portunity.213 Skirmishing over accredited-investor status in the debate
leading up to the Dodd-Frank Act did take away home equity as part
of the one-million-dollar-in-wealth calculation, reducing exposure that
was created by the use of once-highly-profitable home ownership as a
base for retirement security.214 But we have seen that retirement sav-
ings still count, and a retiree who has a lump sum to invest to provide
for all of life's remaining needs beyond what is protected by Social
Security, Medicare, and other sources can certainly be "wealthy"
enough to be accredited and yet be extraordinarily vulnerable.
The anecdotal evidence of abuse through sales pressure to date
has arisen even though the selling is being done by registered
broker-dealers who have obligations to know the security being rec-
ommended, to make only suitable recommendations, and the like.
That is troubling enough, a manifestation of the difficulty of enforc-
ing sales-practice regulation that we discuss more in Part IV. But the
JOBS Act invites new and less regulated actors into the selling arena,
suggesting that regulatory control may weaken even further.215
So the Rule 506 reform is the place where the JOBS Act makes
the clearest trade-off between capital formation and investor protec-
tion. Perhaps the boost to entrepreneurial capital raising will be
worth the harm from more aggressiveness in this area, but that is far
from sure. Should this area become more notorious for abuse, it
could have the opposite effect, causing some capital to move away
211 See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 10-22, supra note 199, at 2.
212 See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156 under the Securities Act,
Securities Act Release No. 9416 (July 10, 2013) 78 FR 44806 (July 24, 2013) (proposing to
require filing of Form D before engaging in general solicitation, adding legend to written
general solicitation, and requiring submission on a temporary basis of written general solic-
itation material). In the same release, the Commission requested comment on revising the
definition of accredited investor. The proposals, approved by a 3-2 vote, were immediately
controversial. See Split SEC Clears JOBS Act Advertising Rules, Issues Proposals on En-
hanced Requirements, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1285 (July 15, 2013).
213 See generally Jennifer J. Johnson, 1leecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, 16
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 993 (2012) (examining the vulnerability of individuals, or "retail
investors," under the current regulatory scheme).
214 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b note (Supp. V 2011)).
215 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 304, 126 Stat. 306,
321-22 (2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a), (h)) (regulating funding portals).
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from start-up investments. While we are sympathetic to the logic of
removing the ban, we would make other changes to moderate its im-
pact-most obviously by revising the definition of accredited investor.
And as we explore more deeply in the next subsection, there were
constructive opportunities for reform with respect to liability and due
diligence that Congress ignored.
This discussion should amply show why the new Rule 506 envi-
ronment should trump either crowdfunding or the new Reg A+ for
any issuer that could possibly imagine a positive reception (after ag-
gressive marketing) in the expanding accredited-only markets. Obli-
gations and liability risks are deeply suppressed at the initial
capital-raising stage. If the issuer is indeed successful, an acquisition
by a larger company-which increasingly has become the most com-
mon form of "exit" from start-up status-is more attractive if all the
start-up's investors are accredited because that acquisition will be ex-
empt under Rule 506 too.216 In fact, we are reasonably sure that this
accredited-only form of capital raising will come to dominate the IPO
as well for many of the same reasons except in those situations where
the issuer's success is so dramatic that access to public investment
makes the regulatory costs (and the ceding of power to the demands
of publicness) worthwhile.217 For an increasing number of issuers, we
suspect this tradeoff will not be worthwhile and other portions of the
JOBS Act accommodate those who wish to remain private, perhaps
indefinitely, even if their shares have a relatively high degree of
liquidity. 218
4. Gustafson Revisited
As resale limits and the general solicitation ban have receded in
Rule 506 transactions, the effect of Gustafson looks far different than
when it was decided in 1995. At that time, Rule 506 was closer to its
private-placement roots in a world of negotiated deals where contract
law could do more of the work. Indeed, the case itself arose in a fac-
tual setting of face-to-face negotiations of a transaction in the resale
216 Acquisitions using stock as consideration must be registered absent an exemption,
and Rule 506 is often used to acquire a private company when all of its shareholders are
accredited investors. This is typically the first step in a reverse merger as noted in Part II.
See Sjostrom, Truth About Reverse Mergers, supra note 21, at 746-48.
217 See VLAD IVANOV & Scorr BAUGUESS, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE
U.S.: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION
3 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsecl03111_analysis-reg-d-
offering.pdf (presenting an economic study by the SEC showing that Reg D in 2010, even
before dropping the ban on general solicitation, produced eight percent more capital than
public offerings).
218 The JOBS Act extends the ability of a private company to avoid '34 Act regulation
so long as it has fewer than 2000 record shareholders, not more than 499 of which are
nonaccredited. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 13, at 338-39.
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market that included extensive representations and warranties. 219 In
the post-JOBS Act world, the focus will be private placements that are
exempt from the full registration requirements of the '33 Act but that
still reflect significant selling efforts. Why would a securities regula-
tion structure based on the four requirements we have described want
to leave enforcement of such private placements to state law, a geo-
graphically limited system that had proven inadequate in a post-1929
world? Gustafson returned us to that world with no recognition then
or in the years since that the world of private offerings has changed so
dramatically.
The private cause of action under Rule lOb-5 continues to pro-
vide a possible remedy so long as the plaintiff can meet the require-
ments of that rule, a remedy that once (but no longer) could be
described as substantively broader than common law fraud.220 That
more intent-based liability system is closer to the fraud-based common
law system than the due diligence approach that the '33 Act applies to
securities offerings, which we have characterized as reflecting the con-
cern for special selling efforts.
Taking Rule 506 so much closer to its radical vision underscores
the original question-when private offerings are sold rather than ne-
gotiated, are we confident enough that accredited investors can fend
for themselves? Here we find Gustafson's biggest and most troubling
impact: the more aggressive the selling (and the more dispersed and
attenuated the individual investors), the more concerning any ab-
sence of due diligence (and other rite-of-passage consequences) be-
hind the marketing.221
Some accredited investors will be savvy enough, but as just noted,
we have no evidence supporting the idea that most do or will when
faced with such a diverse and opaque financial-product mix. As with
reverse mergers and PIPEs, due diligence is the missing piece. The
less threatening JOBS Act reforms (crowdfunding and Reg A+) seem
to have recognized this as they expressly contain due diligence liabil-
219 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 564 (1995) (noting that the only three
shareholders of Alloyd, Inc. contracted to sell it to a single purchaser).
220 See Robert B. Thompson, Federal Corporate Law: Torts and Fiduciary Duty, 31 J. CoRP.
L. 877, 884 (2006) (describing the change from the Supreme Court's pronouncements in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), that Rule lOb-5 departures from common law
were in the direction of adding to the protections provided investors by the common law,
to a regime under which Rule lOb-5 resembles the common law).
221 We are more interested here in the due diligence than mandatory disclosure per
se. Our suspicion is that private placement memoranda are commonplace even when not
legally required, and we share the view expressed by many that the disclosure itself is often
unread. The function of due diligence is as much to discipline the offering participants as
it is to facilitate good investment decisions, especially when high-pressure sales techniques
are employed. That said, we assume that accurate disclosure documents will be helpful to
at least some investors.
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ity. But this recognition is obscured in the Rule 506 context by the
"logic" of allowing general solicitation of anyone who is accredited.
The private-placement exemption, in other words, now may have
taken on more weight than it can bear.
The reality is that with the removal of the general solicitation ban
for Rule 506 offerings, this most-used exemption is now available with
no mandated disclosure, with no limits on the selling process and
without the usual incentives for due diligence found elsewhere in se-
curities selling. Since Gustafson, liability is not a factor as far as the '33
Act is concerned. Yet, a recent study by the economists at the SEC
showed specifically that private offerings produced more capital than
public offerings; in 2010 and the first quarter of 2011, Regulation D
was the largest source of capital.222 What the JOBS Act does is open
those investors to a new world of aggressive selling, including that
coming via the Internet. With the demise of the ban on general solici-
tation, we can expect more aggressive selling than we have seen in the
past. This will put pressure on the existing equilibrium, including the
lack of due diligence incentives and liabilities. It is also possible that
the general solicitation now permitted for private placements will help
create a buzz that lingers in the electronic cloud so as to facilitate
greater selling in a resale market.
We think that section 12(a) (2) in an updated form should be
applied in any context likely characterized by heavy sales pressure with
respect to a significant volume of securities-our vision of what justi-
fies '33 Act-style regulation in the first place-even if not through
full-scale registration. That is the new world of Rule 506. Absent
more protection, general solicitations to accredited investors (as cur-
rently defined) threaten a great deal of harm.223
5. Organized Resale Markets
One of the lingering questions in the aftermath of the JOBS Act
has to do with the resale of privately placed securities through organ-
ized trading markets. As we have discussed elsewhere, a significant
feature of the Act was to make it easier for "pre-public" companies to
raise capital privately and not have to worry as much that they will be
forced into '34 Act publicness because they find themselves with five
hundred or more shareholders of record. The number is reset to
222 See IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 217, at 3.
223 Still, we recognize that the economics of section 12(a) (2) litigation are compli-
cated. Where the amount of capital raised is limited, the incentive of plaintiffs' lawyers to
undertake litigation on behalf of dispersed investors may be limited as well because of a
meager expected return after the costs of litigation, and there may be serious hurdles to
class certification. However, restoring due diligence-based liability at least improves plain-
tiffs prospects, and so restoration would presumably have some positive effects on those
incentives and thus on the level of care that goes into the deals ex ante.
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2000, so long as no more than 499 of those are nonaccredited
investors.224
The reference here to accredited investors creates a curious
mash-up of '33 and '34 Act concepts. Until the JOBS Act, the '34 Act
had not used investor sophistication or ability to bear risk to define
when issuers take on publicness obligations. The likely, and presuma-
bly intended, consequence of the new formulation is to encourage
issuers to participate in private resale markets available only to accred-
ited investors. That should assure that such markets will be important
as alternative trading sites.
To this point, our discussion of the elimination of the ban on
general solicitations has assumed that issuers would make aggressive
Rule 506 offerings, with the securities "locked up" for (just) one year
before they move-aggressively perhaps-to the public markets in
search of greater liquidity and depth of investor interest. But that
would take the issuer to public status under the '34 Act even if '33 Act
registration was bypassed. An alternative would be to bypass both reg-
ulatory systems by staying indefinitely in the private, accredited-only
markets and making sure that the number of record shareholders
stays below two thousand. As we have described elsewhere, the latter
task might not be terribly hard for a savvy lawyer.225
This deserves more attention than it has been given. Consider
the following sequence: The issuer makes a large-scale capital raise by
aggressively targeting the growing population of accredited investors,
doing so without any '33 Act registration. After a one-year holding
period, the securities are freely tradable among accredited investors
with the issuer taking sufficient precautions to monitor the number of
record shareholders so as not to trigger '34 Act registration. No rite
of passage ever takes place. To emerging growth companies (whom
the JOBS Act otherwise tries to tempt into an IPO through its on-
ramp), this has to be an attractive proposition. 226 If securities regula-
tion is indeed severely discouraging to entrepreneurs, this in all likeli-
hood dominates as a strategy. The resulting threat to public markets
like NASDAQ and NYSE is palpable.
That, of course, assumes that accredited investors-retail as well
as institutional-will participate in these markets in sufficient num-
bers to achieve the necessary depth and liquidity. We can make no
confident prediction other than to say that ifsuch private markets be-
came the location of choice for highly successful emerging growth
companies, investor interest would follow (a bit like the migration of
224 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325
(2012) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1) (A)).
225 See generally Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 13.
226 SeeJumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 101-108.
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qualified investors to hedge funds rather than mutual funds). This
would provide a context in the nature of a natural experiment to test
the value of mandatory disclosure and the associated rites of passage,
which the private markets could partially offset in their favor by insist-
ing on a certain commitment to ongoing disclosure through contrac-
tual listing standards. The JOBS Act all but sets this experiment in
motion.
An interesting technical '33 Act question lurks here. It seems
clear that free trading among accredited investors is permissible after
a year, but why not before? Doesn't the assumption that accredited
investors can fend for themselves mean that resales should be freely
permissible at any time? With respect to the crowdfunding exemp-
tion, the JOBS Act says precisely that.
Yet there is a gap here. Rule 144 addresses resales of restricted
securities, providing a safe harbor for resales that meet its clearly de-
fined holding period. Alternatively however, through what is colloqui-
ally known as the common law "4(11/2)" exemption, 2 27 resales are
permissible if made to persons who do not need the protection of
registration, which takes us directly to the issues posed here. But the
need for protection references back to Ralston Purina and its uncer-
tain interpretations because Reg D's alchemy for accredited investors
does not work with respect to resales the same way that it does for
initial sales by issuers to investors. And when the SEC did turn to this
question explicitly in the 1990s via Rule 144A, it authorized free re-
sales only among "qualified institutional buyers"-a category far more
exacting than that of "accredited investor," limited to institutions with
at least a hundred million dollars in their investment portfolios.228
The subtle legal point here is that even if we assume sophistication on
the part of the resale buyer, that buyer lacks the leverage with the
issuer necessary to gain the access to information so stressed in Ralston
Purina. Hence, without an express provision such as that found in the
crowdfunding exemption 229 (or a radical amendment to 144A), re-
sales within the one-year period are legally risky.
We are somewhat surprised that Congress did not do this. Doing
so would have been easy and consistent with the themes that resonate
throughout the JOBS Act. But because it did not, this small '33 Act
speed bump remains in the road to the development of alternative
private markets.
227 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
228 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a) (2013). For a discussion of this provision, see Cox ET
AL., supra note 66, at 374-80.
229 The new crowdfunding exemption explicitly allows resales by crowdfunders to ac-
credited investors but leaves unclear the treatment of any resales after that. SeeJumpstart




REGULATING SALES PRACTICES AS A '33 Acr SUBSTITUTE
Our three case studies illustrate fairly starkly that we have not yet
developed an adequate account for why there is still a need for a '33
Act once we assume that the '34 Act works to make trading markets
more transparent (especially as technology increases that trans-
parency).230 One intuition developed here is that the '33 Act is meant
to guide the transition from private to public-the rite of passage that
supposedly helps assure that the newly public issuer is up to the bur-
dens of publicness. But that is an expensive endeavor that presumably
dissuades certain issuers from raising capital publicly, and it is not
self-evidently worth the costs. Reverse mergers and PIPEs meet a de-
mand for alternative capital-raising devices and have generated
enough success (though the record is surely mixed) that we should be
open to other forms of innovation in the '33 Act area with substitutes
for heavy-handed registration. Rule 506 was ripe for reform, though
what the JOBS Act does may not leave us in the right place.
Our central point in the foregoing is that the major indicator of
the need for regulatory intervention under the '33 and '34 Acts is the
likelihood of sales pressure. 231 That takes us to how that sales pres-
sure is best addressed. Burdening issuers with extensive disclosure ob-
ligations may not be the best way of addressing the risk that its stock
price is being pumped, especially for investors whose investment deci-
sions are not necessarily driven by issuer-specific information.23 2 And
litigation-based enforcement has its own set of concerns. To the ex-
tent that sales practices are what we are increasingly worried about as
markets fragment and become more technologically sophisticated,
230 The three cases do not exhaust the examples of special selling efforts occurring in
a setting with only the less intense regulatory requirements of the '34 Act. The credit
default swaps sales that got Goldman Sachs in so much political hot water in the run-up to
the passage of Dodd-Frank present a similar combination. Goldman argued that it was
merely a dealer making a market with both a buyer and a seller. But Goldman's interest
was not that of a neutral market maker, equally exposed to both sides of a trade. Rather, it
had helped create a special-purpose vehicle that was the nominal issuer of the securities
and had undertaken a large selling effort to drum up interest on the long side of the swaps.
It did this for the benefit of its hedge fund client who sought more securities that would
permit him to take the short side of the swaps, which would pay off if the housing market
declined. The result, also parallel to our other examples, was the absence of an under-
writer or other person providing due diligence even though there were aggressive selling
efforts and a dump of securities on to the market. See Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers
and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WAsH. U. L.
REv. 323, 337-42 (2011).
231 There is evidence that the commissions from selling private placements far exceeds
other kinds of investments, and FINRA's efforts to cap commissions even at the high level
of fifteen percent was defeated by industry resistance. SeeJohnson, supra note 213, at 995
n.9.
232 See Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Guojun Wu, Stock Market Manipulations, 79 J. Bus. 1915,
1936 (2006).
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maybe the right response is not to fiddle with the line separating pub-
lic and private offerings but instead to target the salespeople and their
firms. In other words, some of the issues we have been discussing
might better be considered the concern of the SEC's Division of Trad-
ing and Markets (in cooperation with FINRA) rather than its Corpora-
tion Finance division, the traditional focus of this regulation. As a
historical matter, it is worth noting that when the '33 Act was written,
there was no systematic broker-dealer regulation (that arrived three
years later, even after the '34 Act was originally adopted) 233 and so
perhaps a useful integration project with respect to the two statutes is
to see how much of the response to the risk of sales pressure could be
moved to the other statute.
In fact, with respect to Reg D, FINRA had tried to respond to
perceptions of abuse through greater broker-dealer due diligence 234
and disclosure responsibilities. The disclosure effort, however, was
watered down, and when the SEC finally approved the new require-
ments in the aftermath of the JOBS Act, it actually highlighted the
elimination of mandatory disclosure as a capital-formation-friendly
step.23 5 In the end, neither the SEC nor FINRA seemed to want to go
against the political winds of 2012.
The sales-practice regulation we have in effect today is not partic-
ularly efficient. The problem is that broker-customer interactions oc-
cur in person, over the phone, and (increasingly) through electronic
media-including social media-in numbers and ways that are simply
impossible for regulators to monitor. The penny-stock rules of the
early 1990s tried to disrupt the worst of the selling practices,236 but
they did so largely through consent and paperwork burdens that seem
decidedly old-fashioned just a couple of decades later. The result is
that regulators have increasingly outsourced compliance responsibili-
ties to registered broker-dealers themselves through enhanced inter-
nal supervision and record-keeping duties. Some firms do better at
this than others, and the costs are considerable.
The impending "fiduciarization" of the broker-dealer community
is occasion for a thorough review of broker-dealer sales practices, in-
cluding the circumstances under which brokers should be promoting
and recommending particular stocks in which they have a conflicting
233 See SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 141-48.
234 See supra note 199. FINRA's "know your security" standard requires due diligence,
and this has been imported into the case law in this area. However, in private litigation
under Rule lOb-5 at least, there must be scienter and not mere lack of diligence. See Cox
ET AL., supra note 66, at 1031-35.
235 Approval of FINRA Rule 5123, Exchange Act Release No. 67,157, 2012 WL 2061577
(June 7, 2012).
236 See Joseph I. Goldstein et al., An Investment Masquerade: A Descriptive Overview of
Penny Stock Fraud and the Federal Securities Laws, 47 Bus. LAw. 773, 774-75 (1992).
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interest. This is too big and daunting a topic to address here, how-
ever.237 Ultimately, the art of high-pressure salesmanship probably
defies regulatory control at the point of sale, and existing rules and
regulations already prohibit most of the tried-and-true tactics associ-
ated with pumps and dumps.
The real question is one of surveillance-knowing on a real-time
basis where the risky "neighborhoods" are so that policing can be bet-
ter targeted. Here, the question becomes whether the SEC's own
technology (or FINRA's) could take feeds from all the various facili-
ties that execute trades so as to draw "hot maps" that show sales pres-
sure at work. This, however, should be SEC-wide. For instance, it
seems technologically feasible to know, on a firm-by-firm basis, what
securities are being sold to customer accounts in amounts that suggest
heavy sales pressure (i.e., volume or frequency substantially above nor-
mal parameters for a particular stock). It is also possible to determine
how frequently such evidence of pressure correlates with capital-rais-
ing efforts by issuers and affiliates (including sales under Reg D,
PIPEs, and reverse mergers), as well as whether such sales pressure
conforms to the pattern associated with pumping and dumping-for
example, price inflation during the time of the pressure followed by
deflation later on so that customers who hold the stock eventually lose
money. The result of all this would be to allow officials to develop
statistics that rank firms in terms of likelihood of applying sales pres-
sure posing the kinds of risks that we have been discussing.
That would be useful information to say the least. It would allow
regulators to target risky selling arrangements with fewer prophylactic,
"one size fits all" rules. To our knowledge, even though the SEC and
FINRA are spending more to upgrade their own technology, this abil-
ity-though amply feasible and no more sophisticated than much of
what the securities industry puts to use-is still far beyond current
regulatory capacity, although FINRA has taken useful first steps to-
ward the electronic filing of some private placement-related materi-
als.23 8 The kind of surveillance we are talking about extends this to
the over-the-counter world, where the costs and threatened burden
on innovation would no doubt trigger ever more pushback.
237 For treatment of this topic, see, for example, Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regula-
tion of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 Bus. LAw. 395 (2010); Donald C.
Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. Prrr. L. REv. 439 (2010).
238 See Proposed Rule Change Relating to Members' Filing Obligations Under FINRA
Rule 5123 (Private Placements of Securities), available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/
Regulation/FuleFilings/2013/P285315 (June 20, 2013). The effort to build a consolidated
audit trail at the stock-exchange level, meant to allow better regulatory surveillance of the
kind of market-trading activity that led to the "flash crash" in May 2010 shows that this can
be done-albeit at great cost and controversy. See Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act
Release No. 67,457, 2012 WL 2927797, at *9 n.45, *18-19 (July 18, 2012) (adopting
release).
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But technology-enhanced surveillance need not be this intrusive
to be helpful. Some element of electronic self-reporting by
broker-dealers whenever their trades exceed more than a certain
threshold of volume in a particular issuer's stock could offer greater
transparency than we now have, so long as the SEC (or FINRA) in-
spection process could check for compliance with the reporting
obligation.
If successful, such surveillance could have substantial benefits,
easily justifying greater deregulation in the '33 Act area and perhaps
the '34 Act as well. Assume, for example, that we had these sorts of
hot maps that located unusual sales activity in stocks recently regis-
tered as PIPEs or in the aftermath of a reverse merger, or a new gen-
eral solicitation of accredited investors. The regulatory ability to
intervene on a real-time basis to observe the quality of information
surrounding that kind of sales pressure would precisely target what we
are worried about. There would be less importance to the '33 Act
treatment if this were under control. But it would take a large invest-
ment in new-style regulation for this to happen, and it is far from clear
that we are in a political environment that wants and is willing to pay
for it.
CONCLUSION
Our intuition is simple enough: the '33 Act is driven by concern
for the sales pressures that come from having to dispose of a signifi-
cant volume of securities in a short time and the risks of deception
and opportunism that may result. As more and more hybrid and
other novel techniques emerge for selling securities, the appropriate
regulatory approach is to ask how serious this concern is with respect
to any such type of transaction; the more serious, the more we need
some mix of strategies from the '33 Act template in response. This is
not to say that IPO-style registration is always-or even usually-ap-
propriate. For each of the case studies that we have done here, the
point is not to call for a return to full registration so much as to iden-
tify something missing in the prevailing patched-together, exemptive
approach. In each, it turns out that our main concern is about the
disappearance of due diligence as a discipline on the selling process
and the constructive role that a more capacious liability threat-per-
haps by means of section 12(a) (2), unnecessarily truncated in Gustaf-
son-could play to supplement limited regulatory resources.
Our ambition here has been conventional: developing a theory to
explain the '33 Act and using that theory to address some powerful
contemporary changes in capital-market activity. At least from that
perspective, we are convinced that as entrepreneurial capital-raising
techniques evolve and the JOBS Act innovations take root, policymak-
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